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  The past forty years have witnessed a remarkable transformation in horizontal 
merger enforcement in the United States.  With no change in the underlying statute, the 
Clayton Act, the weight given to market concentration by the federal courts and by the 
federal antitrust agencies has declined dramatically.  Instead, increasing weight has been 
given to three arguments often made by merging firms in their defense: entry, expansion 
and efficiencies.  We document this shift and provide examples where courts have 
approved highly concentrating mergers based on limited evidence of entry and expansion.  
We show using merger enforcement data and a survey we conducted of merger 
practitioners that the decline in antitrust enforcement is ongoing, especially at the current 
Justice Department.  We then argue in favor of reinvigorating horizontal merger 
enforcement by partially restoring the structural presumption and by requiring strong 
evidence to overcome the government’s prima facie case.  We propose several routes by 
which the government can establish its prima facie case, distinguishing between cases 
involving coordinated vs. unilateral anti-competitive effects.   
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Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement 
Jonathan B. Baker and Carl Shapiro 
 
 
I. Trends in Horizontal Merger Analysis 
 
  For half a century, horizontal merger law in the United States has been framed around a 
concern with market concentration.  The strength of that concern has steadily eroded over the 
past thirty years, however, as industrial organization economists have assembled evidence and 
refined their theories of market structure and competition.  As in many other areas of the law, the 
intellectual assault of the Chicago school of law and economics has been highly influential on 
the evolution of horizontal merger law.
1
  During the 1960s, the Supreme Court interpreted the Clayton Act §7 – the anti-merger 
statute, which had been amended in 1950 – to require a presumption of harm to competition from 
merger based on market concentration.  An “intense congressional concern with the trend toward 
concentration” in the American economy warranted “dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate 
proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable competitive effects,” according to the 
Court.
2  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in 1962, in the Philadelphia National Bank case, 
that “a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant 
market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is so 
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of 
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”
3  
The Court explained that application of this rule – now often termed the “structural presumption” 
– “lightens the burden of proving illegality only with respect to mergers whose size makes them 
inherently suspect.”
4  It added that the test is “fully consistent with economic theory,” as it is 
“common ground among most economists” that competition is likely greatest where there are 
                                                 
1 For a broader perspective on the evolution of U.S. antitrust policy during these years, see William E. Kovacic & 
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy:  A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 43 (2000). 
2 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). 
3 Id. 2 
many sellers, none of which has any significant market share.
5  In the Court’s view, this basic 
economic proposition “was undoubtedly a premise of congressional reasoning about the 
antimerger statute.”
6
  The practical result of establishing a strong structural presumption for horizontal merger 
analysis during the 1960s was to prohibit virtually all mergers among rivals.  The poster child for 
structural era excess in merger enforcement, according to commentators associated with the 
Chicago school, was the 1966 Supreme Court decision in the Von’s Grocery merger case.
7  In 
that case, the Court stopped the merger of two grocery chains serving Los Angeles that together 
accounted for only 7.5% of retail sales.  At that time no other firm served more than 8% of the 
market and even after a wave of grocery store consolidations, more than 3500 single grocery 
stores remained in the area.  We very much doubt that a similar merger would draw any 
enforcement interest today.   
  One problem was the low level of market concentration at which the structural 
presumption kicked in.  Prohibiting mergers among small firms “obviously cuts far too deeply 
into the efficiencies of integration,” according to Chicago school commentator Robert Bork.
8  
Another problem was the inability in practice of the merging firms in Von’s to rebut the 
structural presumption with evidence of what Bork termed “an intensely competitive market,”
9 
or with proof that what another commentator associated with the Chicago school, Richard 
Posner, described as “the ease and rapidity of entry” would deter or counteract the possibility of 
higher industry prices.
10  As applied in Von’s and other decisions of that era, the structural 




7 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).  Robert Bork termed Von’s “the best example of Clayton 
7’s disorientation.”  Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox:  A Policy at War with Itself  217 (1978).   
8 Bork, supra n. 7 at 217.   Here Bork was specifically criticizing a companion case to Von’s Grocery, decided 
during the same Supreme Court term: United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).  In  Pabst, the Court 
prevented a merger between two brewing firms that together accounted for 24% of beer sales in Wisconsin, 11% of 
sales in a three-state area of the upper Midwest, and less than 5% of sales nationally.  “In accord with our prior 
cases,” the Court held that the Clayton Act was violated “in each and all of these three areas.”  Id. at 552. 
 
9 Pabst, 384 U.S. at 552. 
10 Richard Posner, Antitrust Law:  An Economic Perspective 106 (1976). 3 
presumption was virtually conclusive, leading to Justice Potter Stewart’s famous observation in 
his dissent in Von’s that the one common thread in merger cases at that time was that “the 
Government always wins.”
11  As a result of Von’s, Bork claimed, horizontal mergers had “all but 
disappeared from the economy.”
12  
  These criticisms of Von’s had bite because they were rooted in changing economic 
thinking.  During the 1960s, the “structure-conduct performance” (SCP) approach was the 
dominant paradigm in industrial organization economics.
13   This approach was based on the idea 
that industries with market power could be identified through simple, easily observed indicia, 
particularly by reference to market concentration (at least in industries protected by entry 
barriers).   For several reasons, however, economists largely gave up on this simple paradigm.  
Empirically, the broad cross-sectional evidence linking market concentration to prices, margins, 
profits, and hence performance was seriously challenged.
14  Theoretically, it was recognized that 
tacit collusion was not inevitable even in oligopolistic markets.
15  Conceptually, there was a 
growing recognition that firms with high market shares could be very profitable either because 
they exercised market power or because they had achieved low costs or other efficiencies.
16
  The  courts  responded    to the Chicago school criticisms of Von’s Grocery and other 
structural era merger decisions by undermining the structural presumption.  An opening to do so 
had been created by the 1974 decision in General Dynamics, where the Supreme Court allowed 
the merging firms to rebut the structural presumption by showing that concentration had been 
measured incorrectly.
17  The acquired firm’s market share based on historical sales was found to 
mislead as to its future competitive significance.  When shares were measured in appropriate 
                                                 
11 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J. dissenting). 
12 Bork, supra n. 7 at 217.   
13 Joe S. Bain, Barriers to New Competition (1956). 
14 See Michael Salinger, The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered, 1990 Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity: Microeconomics 287, for a relatively recent discussion of this literature. 
15 George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 55 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1964). 
16 Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy, 16 J. L.&  Econ. 1 (1973).  For further 
discussion of the problems economists faced when seeking to evaluate the structure-conduct-performance paradigm 
empirically, see Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Economic Evidence in Antitrust:  Defining Markets 
and Measuring Market Power, in Paolo Buccirossi, ed., Handbook of Antitrust Economics, (2007) (forthcoming). 
17 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 4 
units (production capacity based on coal reserves rather than past sales), they showed that the 
firm’s future ability to compete was “severely limited,” and that showing “fully substantiated” 
the lower court’s conclusion that its acquisition by a rival would not substantially lessen 
competition.
18
  At the time, General Dynamics was not thought to have signaled a change of course.  
Writing two years later, Robert Bork described it and some roughly contemporaneous Supreme 
Court bank merger decisions as cases that “stress the particular aspects of each situation in ways 
that do not reform existing doctrine” rather than enunciating “rules of general applicability that 
would undo the damage done by the earlier cases.”
19  B u t  General Dynamics nevertheless 
created a basis for lower courts to reform merger law by reading that decision to permit a wide-
ranging analysis of whether market shares accurately reflected the merging firms’ ability to 
compete.   
  The 1982 Merger Guidelines, promulgated by Assistant Attorney General William 
Baxter, showed the courts how to proceed.
20  The 1982 Guidelines took the view that market 
concentration was highly influential but not outcome-determinative in evaluating horizontal 
mergers.  They indicated that the Justice Department, in exercising its prosecutorial discretion, 
would allow the inference of harm to competition from merger to be rebutted by a number of 
factors, including a showing that entry was easy or that features of the market would make it 
difficult for firms to collude tacitly even after the merger.  Taking advantage of this flexibility 
allowed the Justice Department during the later Reagan years to adopt a much more lenient 
policy with respect to horizontal mergers than was indicated at that time based on the case law. 
  At the same time, the lower courts, under the influence of Chicago school criticisms of 
structural era merger policy, seized the opportunity offered by General Dynamics and identified 
by the 1982 Guidelines.  During the mid-1980s, for example, two courts and the Federal Trade 
Commission held that the structural presumption could be trumped by proof of ease of entry.
21  
By 1990, the D.C. Circuit, in Baker Hughes, an influential decision authored by future Justice 
                                                 
18 Id. at 504. 
19 Bork, supra n. 7 at 218. 
20 U.S. Department of Justice,  Merger Guidelines (1982) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.htm. 5 
Clarence Thomas and joined by another future Justice, Ruth Ginsburg, declared that the 
“Supreme Court has adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach …, weighing a variety of 
factors to determine the effects of particular transactions on competition.”
22 The structural 
presumption had eroded to the point where “[e]vidence of market concentration simply provides 
a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry into future competitiveness.”
23  Accordingly, 
“[t]he Herfindahl-Hirschman Index cannot guarantee litigation victories.”
24   
  As a result of this trend, the emphasis in merger enforcement has shifted over three 
decades from proving market concentration to telling a convincing story of how the merger will 
actually lead to a reduction in competition.  Put simply, market definition and market shares have 
become far less important relative to proof of competitive effects.   
  The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, promulgated in the wake of Baker Hughes, set 
forth two classes of competitive effects theories, coordinated and unilateral, and outlined the 
factors that the federal enforcement agencies would look to in order to determine whether they 
applied.
25  But market concentration remains important in competitive effects analysis, and 
properly so. All else equal, greater market concentration makes both coordinated and unilateral 
effects more likely, and empirical studies show that in comparisons involving the same industry, 
higher concentration is associated with higher prices.
26  Accordingly, the federal enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Calmar, Inc. 612 F.Supp. 
1298 (D.N.J. 1985); Echlin Mfg. Co., 105 F.T.C. 479 (1985). 
22 United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F. 2d 981, 984 (1990). David Sentelle also served on the three-judge 
panel. 
23 Id.  The structural presumption did not disappear, however.  The court acknowledged that “[t]he more compelling 
the prima facie case [based on market concentration], the more evidence the defendant must present to rebut it 
successfully.  Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (2001) (merging firms did not 
successfully rebut the presumption of harm to competition in a merger to duopoly with evidence that the efficiencies 
from merger would allow the merged firm to compete more effectively against the dominant firm in the market). 
 
24 Baker Hughes, 908 F. 2d  at 992 (1990). 
25 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, revised 1997), 
available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm.  These Guidelines were revised again in 1997 to 
set forth an analysis of efficiencies. 
26  See generally, Jonathan B, Baker & Steven C. Salop, Should Concentration be Dropped from the Merger 
Guidelines? in ABA Antitrust Section Task Force Report, Perspectives on Fundamental Antitrust Theory pp. 339-
54, July 2001. 6 
agencies continue to rely on market concentration in analyzing the competitive effects of merger, 
and concentration remains an important predictor of agency action, even in recent years.
27
  We believe that the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, now fifteen years old, offer an 
excellent framework in which to analyze horizontal mergers.   Satisfaction with the current 
overall framework for analysis is reflected in the conclusion of the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, which stated: 
 
The Commission does not recommend legislative change to the Sherman Act or to 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. There is a general consensus that, while there may 
be disagreement about specific enforcement decisions, the basic legal standards 
that govern the conduct of firms under those laws are sound.
28
 
  By its nature, however, the modern approach, which involves many judgment calls and a 
great deal of balancing of the evidence, gives a great deal of discretion to decision makers at the 
agencies.  Likewise, a “totality of the circumstances” approach gives a great deal of discretion to 
the courts.  Predispositions and burdens of proof are very important in applying this framework. 
  Concerns about the effectiveness of merger enforcement using an economically 
sophisticated, fact-specific inquiry are far from new.  Nearly half a century ago, Derek Bok,  
writing about the interpretation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, foresaw the problem: 
 
Economic theory has provided us with much of what little sophistication we now 
possess in identifying and measuring market power and in comprehending the 
interdependence, and its significance, of large, powerful firms.  The aims and 
applications of section 7 are rooted in these concepts, and it would be arrogant to 
suppose that we could muddle through without further assistance. But neither can 
we succumb to the economists who bid us enter the jungle of  “all relevant 
factors,” telling us very little of the flora and fauna that abound in its depths, but 
promising rather vaguely that they will do their best to lead us safely to our 
destination. … This problem cannot be solved, nor can the economist-critic be 
placated, by embracing more and more of the niceties of economic theory into our 
antitrust proceedings. Unless we can be certain of the capacity of our legal system 
                                                 
27 Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, 1996-2005 available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/P035603horizmergerinvestigationdata1996-2005.pdf. 
 
28 Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations ii (April 2007), available at 
http://www.amc.gov/report_recommendation/toc.htm.  The AMC did make a number of recommendations for 
procedural reforms relating to merger enforcement. 7 
to absorb new doctrine, our attempts to introduce it will only be more ludicrous in 
failure and more costly in execution.
29
 
  Below, we consider explicitly the limits on our ability to predict the specific effects of 
individual horizontal mergers and the implications for establishing burdens of proof and burdens 
of persuasion.  Unlike Bok, we do not question the utility of an fact-intensive approach based on 
economic principles.  Rather, we explore whether such an approach, now firmly established at 
the agencies and in the courts, has been properly implemented in ways that reflect current 
economic theory and empirical evidence. 
 
II. Some Courts and Agency Leaders Have Gone Too Far
 
  Many of the changes in merger enforcement law and policy over the past thirty years, 
going back to General Dynamics, have been significant improvements.  They have reflected new 
economic learning and corrected for certain structural era excesses.  Generally speaking, the shift 
from a more formulaic approach based on market definition and market shares to an approach 
that places less weight on market structure, pays closer attention to possible expansion by 
smaller suppliers and entry by new ones, and exhibits less hostility to merger efficiencies, has 
been a big step toward more effective merger control policy.  Like most economists, we support 
the modern approach, with its more nuanced, fact-intensive economic inquiry focusing on 
mechanisms of competitive effects.  We are concerned, however, that the pendulum has now 
swung too far in the direction of non-intervention.
30   
                                                 
29 Derek Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 Harv.L. Rev. 226, 227-28 
(1960) (footnotes omitted). 
30 The “pendulum swings” metaphor for antitrust enforcement was criticized by senior FTC officials at the start of 
the George W. Bush administration.  They instead defended a narrative of continuity between enforcers in the 
administrations of both parties since around 1980, both in general and with respect to mergers in particular.  William 
E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms,  71 Antitrust L.J. 377 (2004);  
Thomas B. Leary, The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 Antitrust L.J. 105 (2002).  We 
agree that there has been continuity in some enforcement norms, particularly the prohibitions on naked horizontal 
price-fixing and market division.  But other antitrust areas, particularly those involving exclusionary conduct, have 
been and remain contested ground as to which perspectives have varied.  We see horizontal merger enforcement as 
an in-between case, characterized by substantial agreement over time on fundamental economic principles, but also 
subject to variation in enforcement approaches, which has been particularly evident in the minimalist enforcement 
policy of the Antitrust Division during the second term of the Reagan administration and during the George W. Bush 
administration.  For this reason, we have not avoided use of the pendulum metaphor in discussing merger policy. 8 
  A. Judicial Decisions with Dubious Economic Reasoning 
  
  The modern trend in horizontal merger law toward a lessened significance for 
concentration does not mean that firms can merge with their rivals without antitrust scrutiny.  
The modern approach simply substitutes a more wide-ranging factual analysis of likely 
competitive effects for a strong presumption based on market concentration.  But some courts, 
perhaps overly impressed by Chicago school criticisms of structural era excess, have in reaction 
overshot the mark in the other direction.  
  One example is the 1990 appellate decision in Syufy, upholding a district court decision 
declining to enjoin a merger to monopoly in the Las Vegas movie theater market on grounds of 
ease of entry.
31  The holding of the case is unremarkable given its procedural posture.  But the 
reasoning and rhetoric of Judge Alex Kozinski’s opinion shows what mischief can arise when a 
court, having discarded the discipline of the structural presumption, chooses to indulge its non-
interventionist prejudices rather than engage in serious economic inquiry and careful antitrust 
analysis. 
  The case arose when the Justice Department challenged three acquisitions by a movie 
theater owner named Syufy.
32  The acquisitions collectively gave Syufy control of virtually all 
the theaters in Las Vegas.  Syufy’s only remaining competitor was Roberts, a small exhibitor of 
mostly second-run films.  Justice did not allege that the merger had led to higher ticket or 
popcorn prices for moviegoers; instead it charged that Syufy had exercised monopsony power 
over distributors of first-run films, exploiting its position as the only major exhibitor in Las 
Vegas to pay distributors less than they would have received in a competitive market.  The main 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
31 United States v Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9
th Cir. 1990).   The government attacked Syufy’s acquisitions under 
the Clayton Act, and alleged both monopolization and attempted monopolization under the Sherman Act.  Id. at 662 
n.3.  For additional discussion of the case and its significance for entry analysis in merger review, see Jonathan B. 
Baker, The Problem with Baker Hughes and Syufy:  On the Role of Entry in Merger Analysis, 65 Antitrust L.J. 353 
(1997). 
32 The case was tried four years after the last acquisition, so some of the evidence was retrospective. 
 9 
defense, accepted by the trial court and the court of appeals, was that competition was not and 
could not have been harmed because entry into movie exhibition in Las Vegas was easy.
33
  The Ninth Circuit accepted the lower court’s view that entry was easy and that 
competition was not harmed, primarily because Roberts had expanded a year after Syufy had 
acquired its last major rival.
34  With a single contested example of fringe firm expansion in 
hand,
35 the court did not investigate the ability and incentive of other firms to enter by following 
Roberts’ model.  Instead, the court disclaimed any need to conduct such an analysis.  It 
dismissed without serious consideration an argument that any serious economist would treat as a 
legitimate possibility:
36  the government’s assertion that entry at a scale large enough to achieve 
low costs would turn out to be unprofitable because it would depress market prices.
37  The Syufy 
panel rested its entry analysis on consideration of whether new firms could enter the market, 
without recognizing that it is necessary also to evaluate whether those firms likely would do so.
38
                                                 
33 The court also dismissed the government’s evidence that after obtaining a virtual monopoly, Syufy had lowered 
the fees it paid to movie distributors (exercising monopsony power), on the view that the government had not 
controlled for other factors affecting those payments, and based on the absence of distributor complaints.  Syufy, 903 
F.2d at 669, 671 n.19. 
34 Roberts opened three multiplexes, none as luxurious as Syufy’s.  Id. at 665, 669 n. 15, 672.  Syufy’s share of the 
box office from first-run films in Las Vegas declined from 93% after its last merger to 75% three years later, id. at 
666, when Roberts sold its theaters to a large national chain. Id. at 665.   The court also suggested that movie 
distributors were large players that could protect themselves, even from a monopoly exhibitor.  Id. at 670, 672. 
35 In the government’s view, the evidence instead showed that Roberts’s entry was not successful (its facilities were 
inferior, its share was small, and none of its theaters made money), and that other informed potential entrants had 
reasonably concluded that entry would not be profitable.  Brief for the United States at 39-41, United States v. Syufy 
Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9
th Cir. No. 89-1575) (Apr. 21, 1989), 1989 WL 1129298. 
36 This possibility forms the basis for the entry “likelihood” analysis in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
issued by the two federal antitrust enforcement agencies two years after the Syufy opinion. 
37 The court saw no need to evaluate this claim because it did not understand it.  In the court’s view, the government 
was advancing “a shopworn argument we had thought long abandoned:  that efficient, aggressive competition is 
itself a structural barrier to entry.” Syufy, 903 F.2d at 667.  The court went on to say that absent a claim that entry 
would be prevented by some sort of structural barrier – as might be created, for example, by “government 
regulation,” “onerous front-end investments,” dependency “on a scarce commodity” controlled by the incumbent, or 
“distribution arrangements designed to lock out potential competitors” – it saw no reason to analyze the issue 
further.  Id.   See Baker, supra n. 31 at 370 (“The government’s argument was about the scale necessary for an 
entrant to do business efficiently and whether committed entry at that scale would be profitable; the court instead 
heard, and rejected, an argument about whether the incumbent was performing efficiently.”) 
38 Syufy, 903 F.2d at 667 n. 13 (“We cannot and should not speculate as to the details of a potential competitor’s 
performance; we need only determine whether there were barriers to the entry of new faces into the market.”) . 10 
  In explaining this decision, Judge Kozinski openly displayed a deep skepticism about the 
value of enforcing the antitrust statutes.
39  The opinion emphasizes the way government 
enforcement can create “a real danger of stifling competition and creativity in the marketplace,” 
and argues that in a free enterprise system, merger decisions “should be made by market actors 
responding to market forces, not by government bureaucrats pursuing their notions of how the 
market should operate.”
40  Judge Kozinski does not appear to consider the possibility that 
antitrust law in general, and merger enforcement in particular, could benefit society by deterring 
or remedying business conduct that lessens competition and creates market power.
41   
  Another example of judicial overreaction to criticism of 1960s merger policy can be 
found in the recent district court decision declining to enjoin Oracle’s acquisition of 
PeopleSoft.
42  The case involved a merger between two leading producers of enterprise resource 
planning software, which is used by large and complex enterprises to integrate firm-wide data.   
  The Justice Department viewed the merger as threatening adverse unilateral competitive 
effects, resulting from the loss of competition between two differentiated product producers.
43  
As an economic matter, unilateral effects do not turn on market definition.  The economic 
analysis is the same regardless of whether the case is framed as a merger generating high 
concentration within a narrow market or as the loss of direct competition between the merging 
                                                 
39 That skepticism may have contributed to the court’s failure to take seriously the economic arguments raised by the 
government. 
40 Id. at 673. 
41 See also, Stephen Calkins & Frederick Warren-Boulton, The State of Antitrust in 1990, Paper Presented at Cato 
Institute Conference, A Century of Antitrust:  The Lessons, The Challenges, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 1990) (“the 
opinion exudes antipathy for merger enforcement”); William E. Kovacic, Reagan’s Judicial Appointees and 
Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 49, 112 (1991) (the opinion “dispatched the government’s case in a 
torrent of ridicule” and “depicted[ed] the Justice Department’s decision to prosecute as virtually irrational”). 
42 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098 (N.D. Calif. 2004). 
43 See generally, Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, 10 Antitrust 23 (1996);  Louis Kaplow & Carl 
Shapiro,  Antitrust   65-70 (Working Paper, 2007), available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/antitrust2007.pdf.  This theory is well-established among antitrust 
economists, described in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and routinely employed at the federal antitrust 
enforcement agencies. See Jonathan B. Baker, Why Did the Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects?  12 Geo. 
Mason. U. L. Rev. 31 (2003). 11 
firms within a broader market where concentration is lower.
44  The Justice Department chose the 
former route, alleging that the merger harmed competition within a product market of high 
function financial management systems and human relations management software.  Justice 
contended that three firms dominated this category of business software – the merging firms and 
SAP – and that Oracle and PeopleSoft were the leading choices for many customers.  The 
merging firms claimed that the market was broader, and that in consequence several more firms 
should be recognized as rivals, including Lawson, AMS and Microsoft.  The court concluded 
that Justice had failed to prove the product market it alleged and hence declined to enjoin the 
merger. 
 The  Oracle case raised three issues related to proof of unilateral effects: the evidentiary 
value of customer views, the legal standard, and the role of merger simulation.  Judge Vaughn 
Walker, the author of the Oracle opinion, claimed in his opinion to accept unilateral effects, but 
in discussing these issues, the court’s opinion betrays a deep hostility to unilateral effects that 
interferes with careful antitrust analysis.   
  In support of its position, the Justice Department introduced evidence about customer 
views.  Customer views surely are an important source of information about buyer substitution, 
the economic force at issue in the analysis of unilateral effects (regardless of whether that 
analysis is framed legally as a market definition issue or a competitive effects question).
45 
Indeed, and not surprisingly, customer complaints in general raise the likelihood of agency 
merger enforcement substantially.
46  
                                                 
44 See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra n. 43 at 92.  The market definition alternatives for framing litigation over unilateral 
effects of merger are evaluated in Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe:  In Qualified Praise of 
Submarkets, 68 Antitrust L.J. 203 (2000). 
45  See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition:  An Analytical Overview, 74 Antitrust L. J. 129, 139-41 (2007) 
(describing sources of evidence on buyer substitution). 
46 Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, 1996-2005, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/P035603horizmergerinvestigationdata1996-2005.pdf (Tables 4.6 & 8.1) (in raw data, 
about half of mergers reducing the number of firms from 4 to 3 in industries other than groceries, oil, chemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals are challenged absent customer complaints, and in all markets 100% of 4 to 3 mergers are 
challenged if the agency has received strong customer complaints); Malcolm B. Coate & Shawn W. Ulrick, 
Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission:  The Horizontal Merger Review Process 1996-2003, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/02/0502economicissues.pdf (Table 6) (for a 4 to 3 merger with an HHI of 2000 and a 
delta of 400, the probability of challenge is 8% with no customer complaints and rises to 62% with complaints). 12 
  But Judge Walker was skeptical of the customer testimony in the case.  He properly noted 
that customer evidence must be tested for its probative value.
47  In doing so, Judge Walker 
recognized that the customer witnesses proffered by the Justice Department were “extremely 
sophisticated buyers” with “decades of experience.”
48  He nevertheless refused to credit the 
customer testimony because the witnesses did not perform extensive new analyses for the case.
49   
Judge Walker accepted that customer views are relevant to the analysis of buyer substitution, but 
he made clear that he would not trust those views unless they came in a form rarely found in 
practice in the business world.
50  If the standard employed in Oracle were adopted, customer 
views would rarely be usable in practice to prove unilateral competitive effects.   
  Judge Walker’s position as to the appropriate legal standard for evaluating unilateral 
effects claims similarly reflects hostility to unilateral effects.  The Oracle decision 
inappropriately requires the government to prove that the merger would lead to a monopoly or 
near-monopoly in a narrow market,
51 while simultaneously expressing skepticism about narrow 
markets as arbitrary or unprincipled submarkets.
52  Unfortunately, Judge Walker failed to 
understand the basic economics underlying unilateral effects. “In a unilateral effects case,” Judge 
Walker writes, “a plaintiff is attempting to prove that the merging parties could unilaterally 
increase prices. Accordingly, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the merging parties would enjoy a 
post-merger monopoly or dominant position, at least in a ‘localized competition’ space.”
53 This 
statement is incorrect and constitutes a clear error in economic reasoning.  It is not true even in 
                                                 
47 “[U]nsubstantiated customer apprehensions do not substitute for hard evidence.”  Oracle, 331 F.Supp.2d at 1131.  
It is appropriate for a court to inquire, for example, whether surveyed customers are representative, whether the 
witnesses are well-situated to judge the response of their firm to changing prices, just what are the customer’s 
commercial interests in the proposed merger, and whether the witnesses articulate sensible rationales for their views. 
48 Id. 
49 Judge Walker explained that the witnesses did not present “cost/benefit analyses of the type that surely they 
employ and would employ” in making software purchasing decisions. Id. 
50 That is, firms rarely in practice undertake cost/benefit analyses of purchasing decisions that assume a hypothetical 
merger among suppliers.   
51 Id. at 1117-18, 1123.  This statement of the law misunderstands the economics of unilateral competitive effects 
among sellers of differentiated products and, if followed by other courts, would create an unfortunate gap in merger 
law.  As the discussion of unilateral effects in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines makes clear, competition can 
be harmed through this route within a broad market in which the merged firm has a market share well below 
monopoly levels. 
52 Id. at 1119-21. 13 
the commonly-used horizontal differentiation model that Judge Walker appears to have in mind:  
unilateral effects will arise so long as some customers of one of the merging firms consider its 
merger partner’s product as their second choice, even if more of the firm’s customers consider a 
third firm’s products to be their second choice.  Moreover, large anticompetitive effects can 
easily arise in the logit model of demand, which lacks any notion of location or proximity 
between the competing firms.
54  Accordingly, when Judge Walker holds that “[t]o prevail on a 
differentiated products unilateral effects claim, a plaintiff must prove a relevant market in which 
the merging parties would have essentially a monopoly or dominant position,”
55 he incorrectly 
applies the modern economic understanding of unilateral competitive effects.  Again Judge 
Walker creates a method of analysis that throws up unreasonable barriers to proving unilateral 
competitive effects. 
  Judge Walker also considers a third method of proving unilateral effects, merger 
simulation.
56  While the court endorses the method in theory,
57 on reviewing the simulation study 
of the Justice Department’s economic expert, the court dismissed the application of this method 
in practice as based on unreliable data.
58  In our experience, the real-world data on prices, costs 
and output available for use in simulation studies are invariably imperfect, especially when 
products are sold in markets with differentiated products where each supplier offers a complex 
array of products, where products are sold in bundles at negotiated prices, and where the 
products are changing over time due to technological progress – all conditions present in the 
Oracle case.  One wonders whether real-world data could ever be good enough for this court. 
                                                                                                                                                             
53 Id. at 1118. 
54 In the logit model, though not in general in unilateral effects models, anticompetitive effects depend upon market 
shares. See, e.g., Gregory Werden and Luke Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, in Paolo 
Buccirossi, ed., Handbook of Antitrust Economics (2007) (forthcoming). 
55 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1123 (N.D. Calif. 2004). 
56 Merger simulations integrate information on buyer substitution, rival conduct, and firm costs in a mathematical 
model, in order to infer the price increase from merger.  These methods are useful for clarifying issues, identifying 
where more evidence is needed, and putting measures of buyer substitution into a useful metric.  They do not 
necessarily require market definition. For a brief discussion with references to the sizeable economic literature on 
this topic, see Kaplow & Shapiro, supra n. 43 at  99-100. 
57 Oracle, 331 F.Supp.2d at 1122. 
58 Id. at 1170.  14 
 The  Oracle decision is deeply troubling because it suggests that three important 
enforcement agency tools for proving unilateral competitive effects of merger among sellers of 
differentiated products – customer complaints, demonstration of significant direct competition 
between the merging firms within the context of a market that includes other rivals, and merger 
simulation – may not be accepted in practice.  Furthermore, the Oracle decision could effectively 
nullify the structural presumption in many cases, by making it difficult for plaintiff to define any 
relevant market other than an extremely broad one in which market shares are low. 
  To the extent that other courts adopt Judge Walker’s hostile approach toward proving 
unilateral effects, the ability of the agencies to rely on the theory of unilateral effects, which is 
well-established in economics, and which has been used effectively in the past by the agencies to 
attack a large class of anticompetitive mergers, will be severely undermined.
59  By attempting to 
create a safe harbor for mergers in which unilateral effects are alleged unless market 
concentration rises to near monopoly levels, the Oracle court overshot the mark.  As we shall see 
immediately below, there is, unfortunately, some evidence that the Oracle decision has indeed 
caused the Justice Department to scale back its merger enforcement efforts. 
 
  B. The Decline of Agency Merger Enforcement 
 
  In January 2007, the Wall Street Journal reported that “The federal government has 
nearly stepped out of the antitrust enforcement business, leaving companies to mate as they 
wish.”
60 Accordingly, “the message is clear for deals with antitrust issues:  It’s now or never.”
61  
Similarly, in March 2007 the New York Times declared that two merging firms proposing a 
controversial deal “have reason to be optimistic” about Justice Department approval “because the 
Bush administration has been more permissive on antitrust issues than any administration in 
modern times.”
62   
                                                 
59 Accord, Amanda J. Parkison Hassid, An Oracle Without Foresight?  Plaintiffs’ Arduous Burdens Under U.S. v. 
Oracle, 58 Hastings L.J. 891 (2007). 
60 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 2007, at C1. 
61 Id. 
62 Stephen Labaton, Sirius Chief Talks of Ways to Get XM Deal Approved, New York Times, March 1, 2007. 15 
  Prior to the current administration, the low point for modern merger enforcement was set 
by the Antitrust Division during the second term of the Reagan administration.
63  The rate of 
merger challenges then was unusually low, as will be demonstrated below, senior officials 
frequently overruled staff recommendations to challenge acquisitions,
64 and those few mergers 
that were challenged were typically mergers to very high levels of concentration.
65 A Task Force 
established by the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, writing in 1990,   
highlighted the “public perception that the [Antitrust] Division may be pursuing an enforcement 
policy more lenient than the 1984 [Merger] Guidelines dictate” during Reagan’s second term,
66 
and cautioned that “[a]ny significant departure from the standards of the 1984 Merger Guidelines 
would be unwise.”
67  
  The non-enforcement approach to mergers of the Reagan II Antitrust Division is evident 
in the statistical record on merger enforcement.  The key statistic is agency enforcement actions 
as a fraction of Hart-Scott-Rodino filings.
68  Commissioner Thomas Leary used this measure to 
                                                 
63 In 1986 the Reagan administration seemed to signal a change of course toward merger enforcement minimalism 
by proposing that Congress replace the incipiency language and lessening of competition test for merger under the 
Clayton Act with a requirement that the courts consider “all economic factors” and only enjoin a transaction when it 
found “a significant probability” that the merger “will substantially increase the ability to exercise market power.”  
50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 347 (Special Supp. Feb. 20, 1986). 
64 See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Decade Ahead:  Some Predictions About Merger Enforcement, 57 Antitrust 
L.J. 65, 71 (1988) (“The Senate Judiciary Committee recently identified ten mergers for which the relevant Antitrust 
Division Section Chief recommended that a challenge be filed, only to see that recommendation overruled by the 
front office.  Post-merger HHIs were available in two of those cases; they were 3025 and 5128.”) 
65 In 1987 John DeQ. Briggs surveyed Justice Department consent decrees in merger cases, and observed that “the 
level of concentration is very high in most of them; one wonders how they got off the ground at all.” John DeQ. 
Briggs, An Overview of Current Law and Policy Relating to Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 Antitrust L.J. 657, 721 
(1987) (citing twelve cases).  Accord, Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Decade Ahead:  Some Predictions About 
Merger Enforcement, 57 Antitrust L.J. 65 (1988) (“As to horizontal mergers, virtually all cases have involved 
extremely large mergers in highly concentrated markets.”).   
66 Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Task Force on the Antitrust Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, 58 Antitrust L.J. 747, 761 (1990). 
67 Id. at 760.  The report also noted that “in the face of a large increase in merger activity, the total amount of 
resources devoted to merger enforcement has actually declined.”  Id. at 755.  More generally, the report highlighted 
the perception that the Division “is more concerned with its non-enforcement agenda – the studied avoidance of 
‘bad’ cases that might hurt consumers coupled with support for legislative modifications that would limit the 
antitrust laws” than with it its enforcement program outside of its vigorous attacks on price-fixing .  Id.  at 748-49. 
68 We do not examine the ratio of merger challenges to second requests because that statistic is double-edged:  a 
increase in the rate could result either from stronger enforcement or from greater efficiency in targeting problematic 
transactions in the initial merger review. 16 
argue that merger policy has been characterized more by continuity over time than wild swings.
69  




   Merger Enforcement 
    Challenges as a Percentage of Adjusted HSR Filings 
 
    1982-85 1986-89 1990-93 1994-97 1998-2000 
    Reagan I  Reagan II  Bush    Clinton I   Clinton II 
 
 FTC  1.0%   0.7%   1.5%   1.1%   0.7% 
 DOJ  0.8%   0.4%   0.8%   0.9%   1.1% 
 Total  1.8%   1.1%   2.3%   2.0%   1.8% 
 
  Leary assigned years to presidential terms with a one year lag (for example, President 
Reagan’s second term began in 1986 but the figures for that year are assigned to his first term) 
because the data refer to fiscal years (which begin three months before the calendar year) and 
because it often takes time for a new administration to staff senior agency positions.
71 
Enforcement actions in the data include court cases, consent settlements, and transactions 
abandoned or restructured prior to filing a complaint as a result of an announced challenge.  
Multiyear averages smooth year-to-year variation in the data. 
  These figures can be interpreted as reflecting merger enforcement activity at the agencies, 
with two very important caveats.
72  First, merger enforcement rates may be affected by 
unobservable changes in the composition of HSR filings.  For example, suppose in a given year 
that a greater-than-normal fraction of filed deals are not horizontal, perhaps because they involve 
                                                 
69 Leary, supra n. 30. 
70 Id. at 139 (Table 2). 
71 Leary ended his data collection with fiscal year 2000, so the Clinton II record is assessed with only three years 
data. 
72 Leary, supra n. 30, discusses other interpretive issues at 121-26.  We also followed Leary by using in the 
denominator the number of transactions in which the agencies were authorized to issue a second request rather than 
the number filed; the adjusted figure is slightly lower than those filed to account for mistaken filings, secondary 
filings and filings in which a party files to cross multiple notification thresholds in the same year. 17 
management buyouts or acquisitions made by passive investors.
73  Since such deals are far less 
likely to raise antitrust issues than deals in which one company is acquiring another, the reported 
merger enforcement percentage could well decline in that year, even if there had been no change 
in the underlying enforcement policy.
74
  Second, and even more important, the mix of deals presented to the agencies, in terms of 
the severity of antitrust issues they raise, is endogenous.  Firms learn about changing agency 
enforcement patterns from their antitrust advisors, who are members of an industry with a strong 
financial incentive to track enforcement trends.  To the extent that advice is informed and 
heeded, we would expect to see a similar fraction of challenged deals every year, mainly 
comprised of “judgment calls” close to the line, regardless of where the line is drawn.
75  It is 
unlikely that this type of adjustment is instantaneous – it may take time for lawyers to infer 
changes in agency views from enforcement decisions and official rhetoric, and perhaps longer 
for clients to be convinced.  To the extent this dynamic is important, and we suspect it is, it 
means that the interpretation of the statistics should focus on the deviation of the merger 
enforcement rate from the average (which was 0.9% for the agency enforcement figures in the 
table).  That is, an unusually low figure should be interpreted as indicating an unanticipated 
recent decrease in merger enforcement, and an unusually high figure should be interpreted as 
indicating an unanticipated recent increase in merger enforcement.
76  More generally, changes 
                                                 
73 The number of reported transactions spiked during the late 1990s, raising the possibility that different kinds of 
transactions arose during that merger wave relative to other years. (The late 1980s were considered a merger wave at 
the time, but the increase in filings then is small in comparison to what was observed a decade later.)  Anecdotal 
evidence, moreover, suggests that management buyouts were common during the late 1980s, and financial 
investments by private equity buyers and hedge funds have become common in recent years.   
74 Similarly, it is possible that in some years, merger filings are concentrated in industries where transactions are 
typically reviewed by the Antitrust Division while in other years they are concentrated in industries where 
transactions are typically reviewed by the FTC.  If so, the observed enforcement rate at individual agencies could 
change without a difference in either agency’s enforcement policy, although the total enforcement rate would not 
necessarily change.  We have not attempted to account for this possibility. 
75 This idea arises generally in any analysis based on data about disputes that reach certain procedural stages.  For an 
important and early contribution, see George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
L.  Stud. 1 (1984). 
76 It is possible in theory that changes in the observed enforcement rate instead reflect changes in the loss functions 
of firms contemplating merger.  If CEOs become more risk averse, for example, they would be expected to negotiate 
fewer mergers that generate antitrust enforcement actions.  However, we think this theoretical possibility is unlikely 
to explain the observed variation in the merger enforcement rate. 18 
over time in the enforcement rate are more informative regarding agency policies than are the 
absolute levels of the enforcement rate. 
  With this interpretation, the figures in Commissioner Leary’s merger enforcement table 
can be explained in a plausible way.  Most notably, the strikingly low merger enforcement rate of 
0.4% during the second term of the Reagan administration suggests that the Antitrust Division 
under AAGs Ginsburg and Rule surprised the antitrust bar with their lack of interest in 
challenging mergers.
77  These data are consistent with the view that the Antitrust Division during 
that period was unusually permissive toward horizontal mergers.    
  To analyze merger enforcement trends in the 21st century, we updated Commissioner 
Leary’s statistics.
78  The main data challenge was to account for the changes in Hart-Scott-
Rodino reporting rules that took effect in February 2001, which dramatically reduced the number 
of mergers filed in the HSR statistics.
79 We determined that filings after the change were 40% of 
what they would have been had the reporting rules stayed the same,
80 and adjusted the recent 
                                                 
77 Similarly, the strikingly high merger enforcement rate, 1.5% during the George Bush administration (1990-1993), 
suggests that the FTC under Chairman Steiger surprised the antitrust community with its willingness to challenge 
deals.  This interpretation is consistent with anecdotal information about the perception of antitrust practitioners at 
the time that the line had been moved toward merger challenges even more than they had expected.  Under this 
interpretation, moreover, the decline in the enforcement rate that followed during the Clinton administration does 
not mean that the FTC under Chairman Pitofsky was less enforcement-minded than it was under his predecessor; it 
simply means that the Pitofsky Commission did not surprise the antitrust bar with its approach to merger review.  
Similarly, the decline from Clinton I to Clinton II in the FTC’s merger enforcement rate likely means that 
practitioners were surprised that the FTC stayed on an even keel after its high-profile successful challenge to the 
Staples/Office Depot merger, rather than ratcheting up its review standards.  Baker worked at the FTC and Shapiro 
worked at the DOJ during the Clinton administration. 
78 The raw data on adjusted HSR filings and number of enforcement actions for the two agencies came from 
Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics, FY 1997-2006, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workstats.htm, 
and Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 2005, Appendix A, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hsr05/P98931twentyeighthannualhsrreport.pdf, 
79 Premerger Notification, 66 Fed. Reg. 8680 (Feb. 1, 2001). 
80 To determine the magnitude this adjustment, we collected quarterly time series on the number and value of 
mergers from Mergers & Acquisitions magazine (which in turn collects the data from the SDC database).   We 
related HSR filings to both the number and value of transactions because HSR filings are fewer and on average 
likely larger than those in the comparison data as a consequence of the size of parties and size of transactions 
screens in the HSR reporting rules.  Using quarterly data from 1990:1 through 2005:3, we regressed the log of HSR 
filings on the log of the number of transactions, the value of transactions, an indicator variable reflecting the change 
in reporting rules set to one beginning in 2001:2 (assigning it the value of 2/3 in 2001:1), dummy variables for three 
of the four quarters of the year, and a constant.  The point estimate of the decline in filings was 60.3% using data on 
“completed” mergers and 59.6% using data on “proposed” mergers.  These regression results are available from the 
authors upon request.  
 19 
merger enforcement statistics accordingly,
81 in order to derive comparable merger enforcement 
statistics for the four year period 2002-2005, which corresponds to the first term of the George 
W. Bush administration:
82   
 
Merger Enforcement 
Challenges as a Percentage of Adjusted HSR Filings 
 
   2002-05 
  George  W.  Bush  I   
 
FTC    0.8%    
DOJ    0.4%    
Total    1.2%    
 
  The recent figure for DOJ and the total for both agencies were below the average of those 
reported by Commissioner Leary, while the FTC figure was close to the average.
83  The DOJ 
                                                 
81 Two adjustments were required.  The first reflected the fact that denominator was too low (by a factor of 2.5), 
because the number of reported HSR filings would have been much greater had the previous premerger notification 
rules continued to apply.  The second reflected the fact that the numerator was too low, because some of the mergers 
that would have been reported had the rules not changed would have led to enforcement actions that did not actually 
occur.  (These are transactions that the agencies would have noticed, investigated, and identified as anticompetitive 
had they been reported, but did not investigate or challenge after the change in rules.)   To adjust the numerator, we 
observed that the bulk of the mergers screened out by the change in rules were less than $50 million (in size of 
transaction), and that in 2000, the last fiscal year before the rule changed, the agencies issued 22 second requests in 
reviewing the 2247 transactions in that category, a rate of 0.98%.  Federal Trade Commission and Department of 
Justice, Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 2000 (Table 2).  We also observed that during the eleven years from 
1990 through 2000, enforcement actions at both agencies together averaged 61.6% of total second requests (614 out 
of 997).  See Leary, supra n. 30, at 137.  Hence every 1000 transactions not filed that previously would have been 
filed would have yielded approximately 6 additional enforcement actions for the two agencies taken together.  In 
adjusting the numerator, we allocated the total additional enforcement actions in proportion to the observed 
enforcement rate during the 2002-05 period, i.e. one-third to DOJ and two-thirds to the FTC. 
82 In the raw data for 2002 to 2005, not corrected to account for the change in HSR reporting rules, the FTC 
enforcement rate was 1.5% of adjusted HSR filings, and the DOJ enforcement rate was 0.75% of adjusted HSR 
filings.  Had each agency instead reported an enforcement rate of 1.8% of adjusted HSR filings under current 
reporting rules, the rate for each would have been equivalent to the 0.9% average rate for agency enforcement under 
the pre-2001 HSR reporting rules. 
83 During the current administration, both agencies have also, and commendably, sought to become more efficient 
in merger review, by reducing the compliance burden on merging firms and by targeting second requests to deals 
that turn out to raise competitive issues.  Thomas O. Barnett, Merger Review:  A Quest for Efficiency (Jan. 25, 
2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/221173.htm; Deborah Platt Majoras, Reforms to the 
Merger Review Process, (Feb. 16 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/02/mergerreviewprocess.pdf.  But 
an emphasis on efficiency in targeting can be taken too far, leading the agencies not to investigate mergers that merit 
a hard look.  Applying an old saying to antitrust, an agency that never loses in court is not litigating enough.  By 
similar logic, an agency that always finds violations when it investigates is not investigating enough. 20 
number was identical to the merger enforcement rate observed during the second term of the 
Reagan administration,
84 which was the lowest in modern history.  We interpret these figures as 
indicating that merger enforcement during the first term of the current administration was 
surprisingly low because of an unusually low enforcement rate at the Antitrust Division, even 
after accounting for any expectations that a new Republican administration might resolve close 
cases more in favor of permitting mergers than would the Democratic administration that 
preceded it.
85
  We confirmed our interpretation that merger enforcement became much more lenient 
during the current administration by surveying twenty experienced antitrust practitioners.  We 
administered our survey during March 2007, when the agencies were headed by Assistant 
Attorney General Thomas Barnett and FTC Chairman Deborah Majoras.  We attempted to 
contact the twenty-four attorneys listed as the leading antitrust lawyers in the District of 
Columbia in an annual survey.
86  We were able to interview twenty of these twenty-four 
individuals, for an 83% response rate.  Eight of our twenty respondents had worked at one time 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
84 We have only one year’s data (2006) for the second term of the current administration. The merger enforcement 
rate for each agency during that year, corrected to account for the change in HSR reporting rules, was 0.55%, below 
the 0.9% historical mean for pre-2001 agency enforcement.  (Without correction, the rate for each was 0.9%, below 
the 1.8% rate that now corresponds to the pre-2001 average.)  Due to small numbers problems, we place greater 
weight on averages taken over a number of years than on data from a single year. 
85 We considered the possibility that the current merger enforcement figures could be low without reflecting a 
change in enforcement policy because they now include a greater proportion of non-horizontal mergers involving 
private equity and hedge fund buyers that do not tend to raise competition issues.  Based on the following 
calculation, we are skeptical of this alternative interpretation.  Between 2002 and 2005, DOJ brought enforcement 
actions in 38 cases.  For those 38 enforcement actions to represent 1.8% of filings, the rate that now corresponds to 
the pre-2001 average, the number of filings would need to be 2111.  During those years 5097 transactions were 
actually filed (after removing a small number as noted in footnote 72), implying, implausibly, that nearly 60% of all 
filings during those years (2986) would need to have been non-horizontal private equity or hedge fund deals that 
would not have occurred in previous time periods.  Cf.  Mark Hulbert, Shareholders Benefit When Managers Have a 
Serious Stake, New York Times, May 13, 2007 at Business Section p.5 (chart indicates that private equity accounted 
for approximately 10% of merger and acquisition activity from 2002 through 2005).  We also considered the 
possibility that the enforcement rate declined over time with no change in agency enforcement policy because the 
agencies have become more transparent, allowing the antitrust bar to improve its ability to predict enforcement 
agency decisions and do a better job of discouraging firms from proposing transactions that would generate 
enforcement actions.  We are skeptical of this interpretation of the low enforcement rate at the Antitrust Division 
because the enforcement rate did not decline at the FTC, which has made similar efforts to become more 
transparent. 
86 2006 Chambers USA, The Client’s Guide at 426 (“leading individuals” in antitrust in the District of Columbia, 
groups 1 through 3). 21 
at the Antitrust Division, and nine had worked at the Federal Trade Commission, so 85% of our 
respondents had prior agency experience.  Our survey instrument is included as an appendix. 
  Our survey respondents consistently told us that in reviewing horizontal mergers, both 
the Antitrust Division and the FTC are “more receptive to arguments made by the merging 
firms” today than ten years ago.
87 On a five-point scale, with 5 corresponding to “significantly 
more receptive,”
88 the average score for the DOJ was 4.8 and the average score for the FTC was 
4.6.
89 Similarly, our respondents consistently reported that the “likelihood of successful agency 
review for the merging firms” for a given horizontal merger is sharply higher now than it would 
have been ten years ago. On a five-point scale, with 5 corresponding to “significantly more 
favorable,” the average score was 4.9.
90  By asking about a given horizontal merger, this 
question was designed to correct for any possible shift in the mix of deals presented to the 
agencies. Our survey respondents report changes in merger enforcement occurring at all stages of 
the merger review process: fewer second requests, a greater likelihood that an investigation will 
be closed rather than lead to an enforcement action, and a willingness to accept weaker remedies 
in those cases where enforcement actions are taken.  We believe that our survey provides 
compelling evidence that there has been a sharp shift over the past ten years towards a more lax 
horizontal merger enforcement policy.   
  This shift appears to have been more pronounced at the Justice Department than at the 
Federal Trade Commission.  We asked our survey respondents whether they saw a significant 
substantive difference today between merger enforcement at the DOJ and the FTC.  On a five-
                                                 
87 In 1997 the Antitrust Division was headed by Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein and the FTC was headed by 
Chairman Robert Pitofsky. 
88 Our respondents gave narrative answers, which we coded on a five point scale to facilitate analysis. 
89 See questions #1b and #2b in the survey instrument.  Some survey respondents indicated that the FTC has grown 
tougher in its review of oil industry mergers over the past decade.  With respect to the FTC, the views of our survey 
respondents differed from the conclusion of two FTC economists, who found that Commission review standards did 
not vary between the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations based on a study of internal agency memoranda. 
Coate & Ulrick, supra n. 46.  When the comparison was over five years – from early in the George W. Bush 
administration (AAG James and FTC Chairman Muris) to today, the survey answers differed by agency.  See 
questions #1a and #2a.  Our respondents viewed DOJ as more receptive now to merging party arguments than five 
years ago; the mean score for this question was 3.9.  In contrast, the FTC was seen as about the same, with a mean 
score of 2.8.  Although “more receptive” to merging firm arguments is not necessarily a synonym for tougher 
enforcement, it is evident to us from the narrative comments our respondents gave and their responses to other 
survey questions that this is how our respondents understood the question.  22 
point scale, where 5 corresponds to the DOJ being significantly tougher, the mean score was 1.9, 
indicating that the DOJ is generally seen as more lax.  Our respondents unanimously believed 
that their clients’ interests would be better served by DOJ than FTC review; this preference 
resulted from a combination of procedural and substantive considerations.  The preference of 
merging parties for DOJ review based on a more lax approach is especially pronounced at the 
current time.  The DOJ is seen as increasingly pulling back from merger enforcement.  One of 
our survey respondents said: “Oracle has been a major factor in DOJ decisions not to bring a 
case.” Another respondent stated: “DOJ is just going through the motions.”   In contrast, as noted 
above, our respondents see a slight increase in FTC merger enforcement over the past five years.  
  The perception that the Justice Department has adopted a very lax merger enforcement 
policy was unquestionably fueled by the March 2006 decision of AAG Barnett not to take any 
enforcement action when Whirlpool sought to acquire Maytag.
91   For a number of reasons, this 
merger was especially revealing regarding the current Justice Department’s merger enforcement 
policy and especially influential in shaping the advice given by antitrust lawyers to their clients: 
•  The merger was highly visible, in large part because it involved two American companies 
with storied brand names that are well known by many consumers. 
•  The merger involved a traditional manufacturing industry, namely residential clothes 
washers and dryers.  As a result, the contrast between the lack of enforcement in this case 
and historical merger enforcement in manufacturing industries was especially 
pronounced.  A similar outcome in, say, a software merger would not have been as 
influential. 
•  The merger involved a dramatic increase in concentration in the markets for both 
residential washing machines and dryers.  According to publicly available data for 2004, 
Whirlpool’s share of unit shipments of residential washing machines in the U.S. was 51% 
and Maytag’s share was 20%.  (GE was third with 17% and Electrolux was fourth with 
9% of shipments; other firms supplied 3% of the market.)  The corresponding figures for 
                                                                                                                                                             
90 See question #9b in the survey instrument.  When the comparison was over five years, a much smaller shift in 
favor of the merging firms was reported.  The mean score to this question (#9a) was 3.5. 
91 One of us (Shapiro) was retained by the Justice Department as part of its investigation of the Whirlpool/Maytag 
merger.  The views expressed here are ours alone and do not rely on any confidential information. 23 
dryers were 56% for Whirlpool and 20% for Maytag.
92  (GE was third with 13% and 
Electrolux was fourth with 9% of shipments; other firms supplied 1% of this market.)   
Using these figures, the merger would raise the HHI in each of these markets by about 
2000, from around 3400 to around 5400, and leave Whirlpool with a market share of 
more than 70%. 
•  In explaining its decision not to take any enforcement action, the Justice Department 
embraced three arguments often made by merging firms: (1) the ability of two recent 
entrants into the U.S. market (LG and Samsung) to expand significantly their imports into 
the U.S.; (2) the presence of large buyers in the wholesale markets for washing machines 
and dryers (Sears, Lowe’s, The Home Depot, and Best Buy); and (3) cost savings from 
the merger would “reduce the likelihood” of harm to competition.
93 
 
  The lack of enforcement action in this case puts into sharp relief the decline in the 
practical significance of the structural presumption.  Given the very large combined market 
shares of Whirlpool and Maytag, 50% plus 20%, if the structural presumption had been given 
much weight at all, it would presumably have been very hard to overcome with these numbers.  
Yet the Justice Department’s closing statement gives short shrift to at least three important points 
which could have supported an enforcement action.   
  First, the statement does not explain why the recent entry by LG and Samsung was 
sufficient to solve any competitive problems caused by the merger.   In a mature market in which 
brand names are important and market shares have generally been stable, why does the presence 
of a new entrant into the market that has grown to, say, 5% of the market over two or three years 
imply that there is no competitive harm when the leading firm, with 50% of the market, acquires 
the number two firm, with 20% of the market?   In the case at hand, would LG, Samsung, or 
                                                 
92 These data are from  Appliance, September 1, 2005, “Share-of-Market Picture for 2004.”   For additional data and 
analysis, see Diana Moss, Antitrust Analysis of Whirlpool’s Proposed Acquisition of Maytag, American Antitrust 
Institute, January 2006, available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/477.pdf. For an analysis of the 
transaction by an attorney who represented Maytag see Brian Byrne, Whirlpool/Maytag:  What Does it Mean for 
Your Deal? 7 The Threshold 3 (2006/2007) 
93 DOJ Closing Statement March 29, 2006, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2006/215326.pdf.  
Further discussion of the DOJ’s analysis of this case is provided by Elizabeth Armington, Eric Emch, and Ken 
Heyer in The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005-06, 29 Rev. Ind. Org. 305 (2006).  This 
article is one of a useful annual series describing the economic analysis conducted at the DOJ and the FTC.  24 
other foreign firms or fringe domestic products have the production capacity and brand 
reputation needed to convince large distributors like Best Buy to carry them?  If so, would their 
products be attractive to those consumers who now see Whirlpool and Maytag as their first and 
second choices? 
  Second, the statement does not address the extent of direct competition between 
Whirlpool and Maytag or the extent to which the merger raised a unilateral effects problem 
(absent entry, repositioning or efficiencies).  Following the standard approach to unilateral 
effects, as discussed in the 1992 Merger Guidelines, one would naturally hypothesize that a post-
merger unilateral price increase would be profitable for Whirlpool, with the magnitude of the 
price increase depending on the price-cost margins on washers and dryers and on the diversion 
ratio between Whirlpool and Maytag models.  Unless Whirlpool and Maytag are positioned in 
very different places in the market, standard models of the pricing of differentiated products 
would tend to predict large unilateral effects given their large shares, especially for Maytag 
models, with the precise amounts depending upon the gross margins on washers and dryers.  In 
fact, since the inroads made by LG and Samsung largely involved higher-end, front-loading 
washing machines, Whirlpool and Maytag may be closer competitors in the lower-end, top-
loading segment than would be reflected in their overall market shares.  Moreover, the statement 
does not acknowledge that unilateral competitive effects can be significant even if rivals have 
excess production capacity, since these effects are based on brand names and product 
differentiation, not on capacity constraints. 
  Third, the statement does not explain the basis for concluding that the efficiencies 
asserted by the merging parties were merger-specific and sufficient in magnitude to offset the 
elimination of Maytag as an independent competitor in the markets for washers and dryers.  The 
press has reported widely that Maytag was a high-cost producer and that Whirlpool was a more 
efficient manufacturer than Maytag.  Normally, absent merger, the lower-cost firm would 
compete to gain share from the higher-cost firm, to the benefit of consumers.  Such competitive 
pressure often also causes the higher-cost firm to become more efficient, again to the benefit of 
consumers.  Plus, rivalry from the higher-cost firm with a substantial (if slowly declining) market 
share typically puts important competitive pressure on the lower-cost firm, inducing it to trim its 
costs and improve its products.  The Justice Department does not explain why consumers will be 
better off if the lower-cost firm, here Whirlpool, is allowed to acquire the higher-cost firm, here 25 
Maytag, thereby short-circuiting this normal competitive process. We note in this respect that in 
July 2006 Whirlpool announced price increases of 6% to 12% for the second half of 2006.  
Among other factors behind the price increase, Whirlpool cited the drag on its earnings caused 
by the Maytag acquisition.
94
  We are deeply concerned that the Whirlpool case is indicative of an overly lax approach 
to merger enforcement at the current Justice Department.   While we can understand that the 
Justice Department might want to wait for strong facts before bringing its next unilateral effects 
case after Oracle, in order to take on the problematic legal conclusions of that district court, the 
Justice Department never raised this litigation issue as a reason not to challenge Whirlpool’s 
acquisition of Maytag.  One experienced practitioner in our survey cited Whirlpool/Maytag as a 
“close deal” in today’s merger environment that “would have had a hard time” getting through 
the Justice Department ten years ago.  We are confident that the Whirlpool/Maytag deal would 
have been challenged by AAG Klein ten years ago.
95   
  We find it instructive to compare the Whirlpool case with the drug wholesaling mergers 
successfully challenged by the Federal Trade Commission nearly a decade ago.
96  Those mergers 
led to high concentration, but they were close cases in part because of a few examples of 
expansion by small drug wholesalers. The FTC refused to credit easy entry based on a limited 
number of examples of fringe expansion without further analysis, and after that analysis 
concluded that entry would not solve the competitive problem in the case.  In court, the FTC 
argued that fringe expansion would be insufficient to counteract or deter harm to competition 
from the transaction.  Judge Stanley Sporkin agreed, holding that “[t]he record developed at trial 
is not strong enough for this Court to conclude that the Defendants’ claim of entry and expansion 
is sufficient to rebut the Government’s prima facie case.”
97  The core issue dividing the drug 
                                                 
94 Ilan Brat, Whirlpool Plans to Increase Prices, as Profits Fall 5.2%, Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2006.  Another 
reason given for the planned price increase was rising raw materials costs.  Materials cost increases of $150 million 
were noted for 2006, but these correspond to less than 1% of Whirlpool’s revenues, which were in the neighborhood 
of $18 billion for 2006. 
95 For this reason, the Whirlpool/Maytag merger would be a good candidate for a retrospective analysis in a few 
years. 
96 Federal Trade Commission v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998).  One of us (Shapiro) was the 
expert economic witness for the FTC; the other (Baker) was Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics. 
97 Id. at 58. 26 
wholesaling cases from Whirlpool/Maytag is how much weight to place on one or a few 
instances of entry leading to a small market share, in the context of a proposed merger that will 
cause a large increase in market concentration.  In contrast to the approach taken by the FTC and 
the court in the drug wholesaling case, the Justice Department, in its review of the 
Whirlpool/Maytag merger, like Judge Kozinski in Syufy, appears to have been willing to accept 
entry and expansion arguments in highly concentrating mergers, despite the fact that the entrants 
had only been able to achieve a relatively small market share. 
  The merger enforcement data, our survey of experienced practitioners, the fallout from 
the Oracle case, and the treatment of the Whirlpool/Maytag deal combine to paint a picture of 
overly-lenient horizontal merger enforcement, especially at the current Antitrust Division.
98 The 
FTC and the DOJ must pay close attention to the ongoing decline in the structural presumption in 
the courts.  Nonetheless, one of our survey respondents expressed a worry that the agencies have 
grown “a little gun-shy after Oracle.” Another stated that he/she was giving the following advice 
to clients: “If you want to do a dicey deal, get it done before the [2008] election.”  This view was 
echoed by a number other respondents.   
 
III. Economic Arguments Merging Firms Love to Make
 
  In a world where the structural presumption carries little weight, evaluating the merger 
enforcement record is inherently difficult and controversial, precisely because each case is fact 
intensive.  The difficulty of assessing the enforcement record is much greater because so much of 
the relevant evidence typically remains confidential (except in those rare cases that are litigated).   
We therefore would not presume to offer opinions on the many transactions that are reviewed by 
the agencies about which there is precious little by way of facts or agency reasoning in the public 
                                                 
98 We do not mean to suggest that during the current administration, the Antitrust Division has avoided all merger 
challenges or adopted cookie-cutter merger reviews designed to avoid serious analysis.  We credit the Antirust 
Division with, for example, litigating the unilateral effects case against Oracle; challenging the electricity generation 
merger between Exelon and PSEG during 2006 (Competitive Impact Statement available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exelon.htm), which the firms later abandoned; and employing an innovative 
coordinated effects analysis in United States v. Premdor Inc., 66 Fed. Reg. 45,326 (Aug. 28, 2001) (Competitive 
Impact Statement), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9000/9017.pdf.  We also do not fault DOJ for 
choosing not to appeal its loss in Oracle.  Even if an appellate court corrected the error in economic reasoning in the 27 
record.
99  Instead, we bolster the evidence provided above by discussing several arguments that 
are commonly make by merging parties, and which appear to be accepted more readily by the 
agencies, especially the Justice Department, than in years past. Our discussion here starts from 
the proposition that the agencies typically no longer consider it sufficient to show that a proposed 
merger will lead to a significant increase in concentration in a properly defined relevant market.  
Rather, the agencies typically seek to establish a particular mechanism of anticompetitive effects.  
Likewise, the courts place far less weight on structural presumptions than they did in the past.   
  Merging parties routinely put forward several substantive claims that, if routinely and 
uncritically accepted by the agencies and the courts, would collectively remove virtually all 
mergers from antitrust review.  We structure our analysis around three substantive claims where 
we detect over-reaching:
100
•  “Effective competition generally requires only three, or even two, rivals.” 
•  “The prospect of entry typically deters or counteracts anticompetitive effects of mergers.” 
•  “Mergers often spur competition and benefit consumers by enabling efficiencies.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
legal rule applied by Judge Walker, the outcome of the case, permitting the merger, may well not have changed 
given the facts found by the district court (which appeals courts are usually reluctant to second guess). 
99 Agency merger enforcement could in principle be evaluated by undertaking a large scale retrospective analysis, 
examining whether the agencies made good decisions either based on the information available to them at the time 
the decision was made or based on how the industry performed years later.  In specifying such a study, it would be 
desirable to study both the mergers that the agencies investigated, whether the transactions were challenged or not, 
and the mergers that the agencies did not investigate.  This kind of retrospective analysis is difficult for enforcement 
agency insiders to conduct, however, and even more difficult for outsiders like us.  Outsiders do not have access to 
the information that the merging firms, rivals and customers provided to the agency at the time the enforcement 
decision was made.  Cf.  Coate & Ulrick, supra n. 46 (concluding that FTC review standards did not vary between 
the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, based on a review of internal memoranda).  Nor is it easy to 
analyze the effects of a consummated merger retrospectively.  To attribute a price increase to merger, for example, it 
is necessary to rule out other explanations, including quality improvements, shifts in demand to favor higher-priced 
products among those sold in the market, outward shifts in demand along an upward-sloping marginal cost curve, 
and increases in marginal cost.  Marginal cost in particular can be difficult to measure, because it can depend on 
more than input prices and scale economies, but also on changes in the opportunity cost of diverting output from 
another market and the magnitude of economic depreciation.  Furthermore, declining prices might be observed even 
after anti-competitive mergers, if technological change drives down costs.  For all of these reasons, merger 
retrospectives are in practice typically conducted one case at a time, do not always succeed in providing a clear 
assessment of merger effects, and are best conducted by the FTC, which can employ compulsory process for this 
purpose.  Given these problems, we are unable to point to specific mergers that the Antitrust Division should have 
challenged during the first term of the current administration beyond raising questions about the Whirlpool/Maytag 
transaction, even though it is likely that there were some, and perhaps many such deals.  For a survey of merger 
retrospectives, see Kaplow & Shapiro, supra n. 43, at 76-78. 
100 These are not the only arguments made by merging firms to which the agencies may have become overly 
receptive.  The “big buyer” argument, which was accepted by the Justice Department in the Whirlpool case and 
Judge Kozinski in Syufy, is another. 28 
 
  We now address these arguments in turn. 
 
  A. What Has Become of the Structural Presumption? 
 
  The non-interventionist approach to merger control policy relies heavily on the 
proposition that little can be learned in general about the extent of rivalry, and industrial 
performance, from market concentration.  A strong version of this proposition states that 
effective competition typically requires only three, or even two, strong suppliers.  In contrast, a 
more balanced approach begins with the proposition that market structure matters, in the 
following specific sense: in the absence of entry and merger efficiencies, a merger that leads to a 
substantial increase in market concentration will tend to raise price, harm consumers, and lead to 
greater deadweight loss.
101  Put differently, a merger is not simply an event that calls attention to 
a market structure with a certain number of firms post-merger; it is also the method by which 
that post-merger market structure is created.  In analyzing the competitive effects of a proposed 
transaction, we do not simply have fewer firms; we also have a merger, a specific form of 
business conduct with the potential to harm competition, and must think about both the merger 
and the resulting market structure in evaluating the transaction.   
  Our survey results confirm that the strength of the structural presumption in agency 
enforcement policy has significantly declined over the past decade. Our survey respondents 
reported that the agencies are much more receptive now than ten years ago to the argument that 
“market concentration is not a good basis for predicting competitive effects.”  On a five-point 
scale, with 5 corresponding to “much more receptive,” the average score from our twenty 
respondents was 4.6. 
  As a practical matter, the key question regarding market structure for merger control 
policy is whether much weight should be given to the structural presumption.  The clear lesson 
                                                 
101 This is a different proposition from the much broader cross-sectional question of whether more concentrated 
markets are performing poorly in some overall sense.  An important and correct part of the Chicago critique was that 
market concentration may be the desirable by-product of economies of scale and the growth of more efficient firms.  
Here we are making a statement about the likely effects of highly concentrating mergers in the absence of 
convincing evidence about ease of entry or merger-specific efficiencies, not about concentration that arises due to 
internal growth. 29 
from oligopoly theory is that market concentration matters, in the specific sense noted above.
102  
By the nature of game theory, there are special cases where concentration does not matter, but 
these examples are not robust.  Yet there is a danger that these special cases will have greater 
impact than is warranted.   
  To illustrate, consider how a merger affects the equilibrium price in an oligopoly in 
which the firms offer differentiated products and set prices independently.  There is a general 
result in such models that mergers will raise price unless they trigger new entry or product 
repositioning by existing competitors or generate merger-specific efficiencies.
103  In one special 
case, however, a merger will have no impact on price, so long as at least two firms remain after 
the merger: the case in which the firms sell homogeneous products, have identical costs, and set 
prices in a one-shot (Bertrand) game.  In this special case, prices are equal to marginal cost so 
long as at least two firms remain after the merger.  In virtually all mergers, this special case can 
easily be shown not to apply; usually, one can directly observe that prices are not close to 
marginal cost, typically because the firms sell differentiated products or brand names are 
important, and real-world price-cost margins must be large enough to allow recovery of various 
fixed costs such as R&D costs.  Likewise, in a bidding market, mergers typically cause price to 
rise, unless one of the merging firms is generally known to be an ineffective competitor, in the 
sense that it has no real chance of being the first or second choice of any buyer.  Yet this does not 
stop merging firms, and non-interventionists, from arguing that “two is enough.”
104  P l u s ,  
additional dangers arise under a theory of coordinated effects when a maverick is acquired by 
one of its rivals.
105  We are not suggesting a return to a mechanical, concentration-based 
approach to merger policy.  We are simply suggesting that large increases in market 
concentration should be given real weight in merger analysis, and that any contrary presumption 
that “two is enough” (or even three) is unsupported by economic theory.  
                                                 
102 See Kaplow & Shapiro, supra n. 43, and Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in Richard Schmalensee 
and Robert Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization  (1989) for surveys that address the relationship 
between market concentration and market performance in oligopoly theory. 
103 See Raymond Deneckere and Carl Davidson, Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition, 16 Rand 
J. Econ. 473 (1985). 
104 See Paul Klemperer, Bidding Markets  (June 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=776524 (criticizing the 
view, attributed to unnamed antitrust consultants, that market power is impossible in bidding markets). 
105 We discuss below the role of mavericks in coordinated effects cases.   30 
  The assertion that only mergers to monopoly or near-monopoly should concern antitrust 
enforcers can be seen at least as early as 1978 in Robert Bork’s highly influential book, The 
Antitrust Paradox.
106  This view corresponds roughly to a policy of allowing most or all mergers 
short of merger to monopoly; notice the similarity between this approach and that of Judge 
Walker in Oracle.  While there are no doubt some markets with only two major firms in which 
those firms compete vigorously against each other (possible examples that come to mind are 
Boeing vs. Airbus in commercial aircraft and Intel vs. AMD in microprocessors), there is simply 
no theoretical or empirical basis for a presumption that horizontal mergers are innocuous (or 
beneficial) so long as they are not to monopoly. 
  An even more striking example of over-reaching in denying an effect for market 
concentration can be found in a recent article by Tom Campbell. Campbell contends that 
“[p]roducers of a good should be allowed to merge whenever there is only one purchaser of the 
good, or when the large majority of purchases are in favor of the merger of producers.”
107  
Campbell argues in favor of permitting even mergers to monopoly based on the assertion that 
with bilateral bargaining there is no deadweight loss because the quantity sold under bilateral 
bargaining is always equal to the amount that would be sold under perfect competition.
108 
Campell’s theory is inconsistent with the modern economic understanding that bargaining with 
asymmetric information typically leads to inefficient outcomes.
109  His paper illustrates the 
                                                 
106 According to Bork, “[o]ligopolistic structures probably do not lead to significant restrictions of output.”  Bork, 
supra n. 7 at 196.  On this basis, he concludes that “most mergers involving fewer than all significant rivals in the 
market would rarely increase the slope of the firm’s demand curve enough to pose a serious problem. The effect 
would usually be outweighed by cost savings.”  Id. at 221. 
107 Tom Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly in Mergers, University of California at Berkeley (2006).  
108 Campbell contends that “[o]utput is at the competitive level when a monopolist sells to a monopsonist,” id. at 2, 
and argues that “[t]his truth compels that mergers to monopoly be viewed as socially desirable when the purchaser is 
a monopsony.”  Id. at 12.  Campbell testified similarly on behalf of Oracle in the Oracle case. 
109 A large theoretical literature examines the inefficiencies that arise in bilateral bargaining situations, beginning 
with Roger Myerson & Mark Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. Econ. Theory 265 
(1983).  Myerson and Satterthwaite establish the general impossibility of achieving efficiency in voluntary bilateral 
bargaining with private information.  While two-part tariffs and other contractual forms can reduce the deadweight 
loss associated with supplier market power, it is easy to find empirical examples where suppliers with market power 
charge prices well above marginal cost (thus causing some deadweight loss) in situations where those suppliers 
engage in bilateral bargaining with their customers.  Microsoft’s dealings with its computer manufacturer customers 
such as Dell or Hewlett-Packard are but one obvious example.  Campbell’s approach also departs sharply from the 
traditional focus of merger control policy on consumer welfare. 
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danger of basing sweeping policy recommendations on a simple and special theoretical model 
that is not robust and lacks empirical support. 
 
B. Evaluating Entry and Expansion Arguments 
 
  We noted above that entry and expansion arguments were accepted in Syufy and in the 
Whirlpool/Maytag merger investigation based on limited examples, while such arguments were 
not accepted in the drug wholesaling merger litigation.   
  Our survey results confirm that the agencies are more willing to accept entry arguments 
now than they were ten years ago.  Our survey respondents reported that the agencies are more 
receptive now than ten years ago to the argument that “entry will counteract or deter any 
competitive problem.”  On a five-point scale, with 5 corresponding to “much more receptive,” 
the average score from our twenty respondents was 3.9. 
  Again, there is a simple economic model in which the prospect of entry does indeed 
counteract or deter any competitive problem.  That is the model in which there is a perfectly 
elastic supply from entrants at the current market price.  This is a variant of the standard model 
of perfect competition, in which many small firms are just as efficient as the merging firms, even 
if the latter are far larger.  That model might apply to some markets for homogeneous products, 
but it is extremely special and certainly not an appropriate basis for a general presumption in 
merger policy.   
  A variant of this special case arises when considering how to treat foreign production 
capacity in analyzing mergers in U.S. markets when there are some imports.  In such cases, it is a 
clear economic error to assume that the entire foreign capacity would be devoted to the U.S. 
market if prices were to rise a small amount.
110  Rather, the effects of the merger depend upon 
the elasticity of supply of imports at prices at and above the pre-merger price. To the extent that 
foreign capacity is being used profitably to supply customers elsewhere in the world, it will 
typically become increasingly costly for the importing firm to divert that capacity to the U.S. 
                                                 
110 William Landes and Richard Posner make this error in the context of geographic market definition in their 
influential article on market power.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 937, 963 (1981),  For another argument explaining why Landes & Posner were not correct, see 
Timothy J. Brennan, Mistaken Elasticities and Misleading Rules, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1982). 32 
market.  Furthermore, any coherent analysis must be consistent with the pre-merger level of 
imports being optimal for the foreign firms.  Simply stating that foreign firms have sufficient 
capacity to discipline a price increase by the merging firms (or by a broader group of domestic 
suppliers) is an incomplete and misleading story.  
  There is one other model in which potential entry is a very potent force and mergers 
between incumbents have no anticompetitive effects: the model of contestable markets, in which 
entry does not involve any sunk costs.  This model has the advantage of applying to industries in 
which there are significant scale economies.  However, the model generally is not suitable or 
reliable for merger analysis.
111  To begin with, in the model of contestable markets there is no 
strategic difference between an incumbent (however large) and a potential entrant, so it is not 
clear why a merger would ever be profitable.  More importantly, this model does not allow for 
any unique firm-specific assets such as brand names or reputation, or other unique capabilities, 
such as those associated with patents and trade secrets.  Nor does the model place any limit on 
the rate of internal growth by an entrant; entry can occur instantly at efficient scale, however 
large.  Once one understands the many strong and unrealistic assumptions behind the model of 
contestable markets, it becomes clear that the model is rarely applicable to real-world mergers. 
  In practice, merging parties like to point to specific instances of entry in order to suggest 
that entry is easy.  Frequently, there will indeed be at least one or two examples of past entry.  
But evidence of past entry is inherently double-edged, consistent both with low entry barriers in 
the past (which permitted it) or past exercise of market power (which induced it).  Truly 
successful entry, in which the entrant has achieved (or predictably will soon achieve) a sizeable 
market share and places substantial competitive pressure on incumbents, should certainly be the 
basis for careful entry analysis, focusing on whether other firms would likely also have success 
following a similar plan, and whether such entry would likely counteract or deter any post-
                                                 
111 The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines call this “uncommitted entry,” and include the production capacities of 
such firms when measuring market shares.  We believe that the Guidelines set forth an appropriate way of treating 
uncommitted entry, and we agree with the Guidelines and courts that if there were unlimited uncommitted entry, no 
merger would harm competition.   Our claim here is simply that rapid uncommitted entry on a large scale rarely if 
ever arises in the oligopoly markets where mergers are given close scrutiny, and  in consequence it is inappropriate 
to presume that such markets are contestable.  For a survey of the empirical evidence demonstrating that the airline 
industry is not contestable, contrary to what the authors of the theory originally conjectured, see Jonathan B. Baker, 
Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion:  Proving Coordinated Effects Under the Antitrust Laws, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
135, 170-71 (2002). 33 
merger exercise of market power.  But the mere presence of some examples of entry, in which 
the entrants have not (yet) exited the market, should not form a basis for embracing the view that 
entry will solve any competitive problems caused by the merger, especially when the shares of 
the merging firms are large and those of the entrants are small.
112  
  Several important arguments regularly arise when evaluating entry arguments.  Many of 
these considerations were relevant in the Whirlpool/Maytag case.  As a general proposition, we 
doubt that these arguments are receiving sufficient weight today in merger policy: 
•  Taking as given the presence of a “poster-child” recent entrant, the elimination of 
competition caused by the merger may still be significant.  The particular entrant’s 
competitive role may reasonably be assessed based on its current market share, adjusted 
as necessary to reflect likely changes in that share in the near future. 
•  The fact that one firm has been able to enter does not necessarily imply that others will 
find it profitable to do so.  Regardless of past entry, future entry may not be profitable, 
especially if the demand is stagnant or declining.  Furthermore, if the entrant enjoyed an 
advantage based on certain firm-specific assets that made entry attractive, one should 
study whether other potential entrants also possess comparable assets, or other assets that 
are valuable for entry.
113 
•  Entry may be easier in some segments of the market than others.  In markets with 
differentiated products, the fact that entry has proven possible in one segment, such as the 
low-price segment, does not imply that entry would be profitable in another segment.  For 
example, brand name and reputation may be more important, and take longer to build, or 
technical requirements may be greater, in the high-price, high-performance segment of 
the market.  Or transportation costs may be more important in at the low end of the 
market.  If both of the merging firms operate in a segment of the market where entry has 
not been demonstrated, entry is less likely to solve competitive problems.
114 
                                                 
112 This inappropriate reasoning was arguably adopted by the appellate court in Syufy.  See Baker, supra n. 31. 
113 Cf.  U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §3.1 (1992, 
revised 1997) (evaluating entry by analyzing specific entry alternatives); id. at § 3.4 (analyzing sufficiency of entry). 
114 The Merger Guidelines make a similar point.  “[W]here the competitive effect of concern is not uniform across 
the relevant market, in order for entry to be sufficient, the character and scope of entrants’ products must be 
responsive to the localized sales opportunities that include the output reduction associated with the competitive 34 
•  Entry generally takes time, and competition can be harmed while entrants gain enough 
scale, scope, and credibility to replace the lost competition from merger, for example by 
competing as effectively as did the weaker of the two merging parties.
115 
 
  C. Evaluating Efficiency Claims 
 
  In 1997, a new section on merger efficiencies was added to the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines.116  This was a positive development, since a proper analysis of competitive effects 
should surely account for merger efficiencies above and beyond the presumed efficiencies 
implicit in the “safe harbors” that have long been a feature of the Guidelines.   In fact, one of the 
advantages of the unilateral effects theory is that it allows for the integration of efficiencies into 
the competitive effects analysis, comparing quantitatively the incentive to raise price due to 
lessened competition and the incentive to lower price based on reductions in variable costs.
117  
We believe that the revised merger guidelines provide a sound framework within which claims 
of merger efficiencies can be evaluated.  We highlight two aspects of that framework that we 
consider especially important: the requirements that efficiencies be merger-specific and verified 
before they can be counted to offset any to anticompetitive effects of the merger.  If the standards 
used to meet these requirements are lowered, some phantom efficiencies will be credited, leading 
to overly lax enforcement. 
                                                                                                                                                             
effect of concern.  For example, where the concern is unilateral price elevation, as a result of a merger between 
producers of differentiated products, entry, in order to be sufficient, must involve a product so close to the products 
of the merging firms that the merged firm will be unable to internalize enough of the sales loss due to the price rise, 
rendering the price increase unprofitable.”  U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines §3.4 (1992, revised 1997) . 
115 It is possible to imagine situations in which the entrant must compete more (or less) effectively than the weaker 
merging firm in order to counteract or deter adverse competitive effects of merger, but comparing the entrant to the 
weaker of the merging firms can be useful in structuring the timeliness and sufficiency analysis.  Cf. Janusz A. 
Ordover & Jonathan B. Baker, Entry Analysis Under the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 61 Antitrust L.J. 139, 
145 n. 23 (1992) (“the timeliness requirement [for entry in the Merger Guidelines] can be thought of as an 
intertemporal sufficiency requirement; entry will not be sufficient if it is delayed.”).   
116 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §4 (1992, revised 
1997) . 
117 A useful result along these lines can be found in Gregory Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare 
Enhancing Mergers Among Differentiated Products, 44 J. Indus. Econ. 409 (1996).  Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, 
Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 Amer. Econ. Review, 107 (1990) provide a general analysis for 
the case of Cournot oligopoly. 35 
  Our survey results confirm that the agencies are more willing to accept efficiency 
arguments now than they were ten years ago.  Our survey respondents reported that the agencies 
are more receptive now than ten years ago to the argument that “the pro-competitive benefits of 
efficiencies from merger outweigh the threat of harm to competition.” On a five-point scale, with 
5 corresponding to “much more receptive,” the average score from our twenty respondents was 
4.3.  While our respondents identified a clear trend, a number also believe that there remains a 
great deal of skepticism at both agencies about efficiency arguments mounted by the merging 
parties.  
  There is considerable evidence, moreover, that acquiring firms are systematically over-
optimistic about the efficiencies they can achieve through acquisition.
118  Evidence from the 
finance, managerial, and economics literatures shows that many mergers do not work out well, 
either in terms of shareholder value or organizationally.  This evidence supports the view that 
many mergers are motivated by managerial hubris, perhaps exacerbated by distorted managerial 
compensation schemes, and that managers often underestimate integration problems.  This 
evidence certainly does not support the view that merger-specific efficiencies are common or 
that claims of efficiencies made by merging parties should generally be credited.  Some mergers 
are undoubtedly motivated by the pursuit of genuine efficiencies and go on to generate them. But 
we caution that arguments by merging firms that efficiencies will enhance their ability and 
incentive to compete, resulting in lower prices, higher quality or new products, should not be 
accepted based solely on their plausibility, but only after careful analysis.
119
 
IV. Structuring Merger Analysis in a Post-Chicago World
 
  The challenge facing those who seek effective and principled merger enforcement policy 
is to develop a set of analytical steps that charts a moderate course:  relying on measures of 
market share but not excessively, and not accepting the three “E” arguments of entry, expansion, 
and efficiency without first testing them rigorously using real-world evidence.  We believe that 
                                                 
118 This evidence is reviewed in Kaplow & Shapiro, supra n. 43. 36 
such a moderate course must include the use of suitably crafted presumptions which have real 
bite in the sense that strong evidence is required to overcome them. 
  Presumptions and burdens of proof are critical when analyzing horizontal mergers.  Most 
merger review is prospective, requiring predictions about how a proposed merger will affect 
competition.
120  These predictions are inherently difficult to make and subject to a considerable 
uncertainty; such is the nature of complex social and economic systems.  Therefore, in many if 
not most cases, neither the government nor the merging parties will be able to offer ironclad 
proof of a theory of how the proposed merger will affect competition.  Unless the government 
has some simple and sensible way of establishing a presumption of harm to competition, 
consistent with sound economic analysis, which the merging parties must then overcome to 
persuade a court to permit the transaction, few proposed mergers will be subject to effective 
challenge.  While some may welcome that result, we do not believe such a lax approach to 
merger enforcement is consistent with sound antitrust policy.  Our survey respondents generally 
agree with us that the decline in merger enforcement over the past decade has been detrimental to 
effective competition policy.  We asked respondents whether the changes in agency enforcement 
policy over the past ten years have “improved competition policy” or “been detrimental to 
effective competition policy.”  On a five-point scale, with 5 corresponding to “significantly 
improved competition policy,” the average response in our survey to this question was 2.2, 
distinctly less than the neutral figure of 3.0.
121
                                                                                                                                                             
119 For an example of a case where one of us (Baker) testified that the exacting standards of the Merger Guidelines 
were met, see Jonathan B. Baker, Efficiencies and High Concentration:  Heinz Proposes to Acquire Beech-Nut 
(2001), in John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, eds., The Antitrust Revolution 150 (4
th ed. 2004). 
120 Given the inherent uncertainty of predicting the effects of proposed mergers, decision theory might seem to 
suggest an alternative approach in which most merger challenges would be deferred until after the mergers have 
been consummated and their effects can be discerned.  Unfortunately, this approach is not attractive because of the 
uncertainty it would create surrounding consummated mergers.  For this reason alone, we very much doubt that the 
business community would welcome a shift in this direction.  Relying largely on ex post merger review would 
present other serious problems as well: competition could well be harmed on an interim basis, the conduct of the 
merged entity would be influenced by the prospect of subsequent review, the competitive effects of merger can be 
difficult to isolate after years of intervening market developments, divestiture often is much more costly after the 
merging firms’ assets have been scrambled, and subsequent divestiture may be ineffective in restoring competition.  
Sound public policy unavoidably requires that the primary review of proposed mergers take place before they are 
consummated. 
121 Whether respondents believed the changes have improved competition policy or been detrimental to competition 
policy, they reported the same shift over the past decade towards less merger enforcement.   For this reason, we are 37 
  Moreover, presumptions, like other bright-line rules, have many advantages in merger 
analysis from a decision-theoretic perspective.  They give guidance to firms seeking to stay 
within the law, and they give guidance to lower courts on how to apply the law when reviewing 
proposed deals.  They also help make merger law more easily administrable.  That is, they 
reduce the transactions costs of antitrust enforcement and adjudication, by structuring and 
simplifying the analysis used by the courts to determine whether firms have acted within the law.  
Their primary disadvantage is that they can generate more errors in determining whether 
business conduct is harmful than would occur with a less structured and potentially more wide-
ranging inquiry.  To minimize this disadvantage, it is essential that presumptions employed in 
merger review have a sound economic grounding. They must be based on observable features of 
market structure that economic understanding suggests correlate well with harm to 
competition.
122   
  Historically, in analyzing horizontal mergers, the courts have relied on a presumption 
based on market concentration. We have traced above the dramatic erosion in the structural 
presumption over time. and the profound effects of that erosion on merger control policy.  The 
time has come to update the structural presumption to reflect advances in economic learning as 
well as the lessons learned from the record of merger enforcement over the past forty years.  We 
do not seek to discard structural presumptions, nor to return to the more mechanical approach 
from the 1960s.  Rather we seek to reinvigorate horizontal merger enforcement with 
presumptions that are both practical and based on sound economic analysis. 
 
V. Presumptions and Burden-Shifting in a Post-Chicago World
 
  How should a court, confronted with the obligation to decide whether to enjoin a 
proposed horizontal merger, make that decision?  How should it incorporate modern economic 
thinking and avoid the erroneous economic reasoning we have criticized, while remaining 
faithful to the established legal approach to merger review?  Our answer is to rely on the familiar 
                                                                                                                                                             
confident that our survey results regarding the decline of merger enforcement over time are not biased by partisan 
considerations. 
122 They must also be difficult to manipulate by firms seeking to disguise a harmful merger in order to avoid 
triggering the presumption. 38 
legal framework based on presumptions and burden-shifting, but to specify those presumptions 
in a way that is simultaneously consistent with precedent and more closely attuned to the modern 
economics of horizontal merger analysis.  This section sketches our suggested approach.
123  
When we offer specific benchmarks (for HHI levels, number of firms, price increases and the 
like), we do so tentatively to make clear the type of showing we think appropriate and as an 
impetus to further discussion of the specific details.  
 
  A. Steps in Merger Analysis in the Courts 
 
  Under the well-established legal framework for merger analysis,
124 the government, bears 
the burden of persuasion but, as with all other cases, the burden of production shifts during 
litigation.
125  The government satisfies its initial burden of production by introducing evidence 
that concentration in a well-defined market is high and will significantly increase as a 
consequence of the merger (thus establishing a prima facie case through application of the 
structural presumption), and by articulating the economic logic by which it believes competition 
will be harmed, such as coordinated or unilateral effects.
126  This demonstration shifts a burden 
of production to the merging firms to explain why the inference of likely competitive harm from 
the change in market concentration is unlikely in fact to be realized.  If the merging firms satisfy 
their burden of production, the burden of production shifts back to the government, which may 
                                                 
123 For clarity, we talk exclusively about mergers between competing sellers.  A similar analysis would apply when 
buyers merge and thus gain additional buying power over certain suppliers, i.e., when monopsony power is the issue 
rather than monopoly power.  Throughout, we assume that the merger analysis is prospective.  For simplicity, and 
following the literature, we talk about the comparison between “pre-merger” and “post-merger” competition.  The 
term “pre-merger” as used here should be understood to mean “but-for” the merger.  To the extent that the market is 
changing in ways that can reasonably be foreseen at the time the merger is being reviewed, conditions “but-for” the 
merger will differ from the actual, pre-merger conditions. For simplicity, we also refer to the plaintiff as the 
“government,” which is typically but not always the case. 
124 United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 
F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
125 To satisfy a burden of production, a party must provide enough evidence to avoid summary judgment or 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the other side. 
126 Although the government’s initial burden is satisfied by proof of market shares in the structural era Supreme 
Court precedents, lower courts and the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines today routinely and sensibly expect the 
government to articulate an economic theory by which the merger would harm competition (such as unilateral or 39 
discredit the defendants’ showing or provide additional evidence of anticompetitive effect.  The 
burden of persuasion remains on the government at all times.   
  Within this framework, the structural presumption identifies the minimum quantum of 
evidence the government must present in order to satisfy its burden of production, and hence 
shift a burden of production to the merging firms.  Understood this way, the structural 
presumption specifies elements sufficient to prove an offense (a merger that violates the Clayton 
Act).  But this observation does not fully capture the significance of the structural presumption in 
merger analysis because it does not explain how the identical presumption could be virtually 
irrebuttable during the 1960s while readily rebutted today.  Indeed, in practical effect, the 
presumption has varied in strength along with the confidence of economists in the strength of the 
relationship between concentration and competition – from a showing that once created a virtual 
per se prohibition against horizontal mergers to simply a factual predicate that triggers a wide-
ranging analysis of the proposed transaction.   
  In this subsection, we outline the factual showing we think should be sufficient to create a 
presumption that a proposed horizontal merger creates adverse coordinated or unilateral 
competitive effects, given the modern economic understanding of the effects of mergers on 
competition.  We intend this stage of the analysis to fill the dual role the structural presumption 
played in the past:  to identify factual showings that would satisfy the government’s initial 
burden, and to give a court confidence that if the specified elements are ultimately established, 
harm to competition would indeed likely result.  Under our recommended approach, rebuttal is 
certainly possible, but requires that the merging parties present strong evidence, consistent with 
pre-merger market conditions and economic theory, showing that the anti-competitive effects 
alleged by the government are not in fact likely to result from the merger.
127  
  We also intend the presumptions we set forth to be consistent with the established legal 
framework for merger analysis.  This raises a fundamental issue with respect to unilateral 
                                                                                                                                                             
coordinated effects).  Doing so is not formally part of the government’s initial burden of production, but it arguably 
has become so as a practical matter.   
127 It is difficult to articulate the deference that should be accorded to the presumption in a way that could be reduced 
to a jury instruction.  One possibility would be for courts to insist on “clear and convincing” evidence for rebuttal, 
appealing to an evidentiary standard that is higher than a preponderance of the evidence.  We have instead said that 
rebuttal evidence needs to be “strong” in order to convey our sense that the elements we specify for invoking a 40 
competitive effects.  The structural presumption, based on market concentration, was developed 
by the Supreme Court in a context in which coordinated effects were at issue.   However, market 
concentration can be a poor predictor of harm to competition when the theory of competitive 
harm involves unilateral competitive effects among sellers of differentiated products.  One 
reason is the difficulty of drawing lines to define markets when products are differentiated and 
clear gaps in the chain of substitutes do not exist.  In addition, oligopoly theory tells us that the 
merging firms’ market shares will tend to overstate the unilateral effects of the merger if the 
firms’ products are relatively distant within the relevant market.  Likewise, the merging firms’ 
market shares will tend to understate the unilateral effects of the merger if the firms’ products are 
especially close within the relevant market.  Predicted unilateral effects depend upon the degree 
of demand substitution between products sold by the merging firms, not market shares.
128
  For all of these reasons, in cases involving unilateral competitive among sellers of 
differentiated products, it is important to allow the government also to establish its prima facie 
case with evidence that the degree of buyer substitution between the products offered by the 
merging parties, as measured by diversion ratios or cross-price elasticities of demand, is 
substantial.  This approach appropriately emphasizes an aspect of market structure that is more 
closely related in modern economic theory to unilateral effects than is overall market 
concentration.  This approach also will protect against faulty outcomes, as in Oracle, where there 
was strong evidence of direct competition between the merging parties but the government lost 
due to the difficulty of defining the relevant market absent clear gaps in the chain of substitutes.   
  We believe that our recommended approach is consistent with modern antitrust analysis.  
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has come to recognize in other areas of antitrust that direct 
evidence of harm to competition can obviate the need for inferring that harm from market 
concentration.
129  Indeed, direct evidence regarding competition, such as evidence of buyer 
responses to past price movements or the costs of consumer switching, can be more probative 
                                                                                                                                                             
presumption give good reason to think that harm to competition will indeed result, while leaving for later discussion 
the question of how the resulting deference should best be incorporated into a legal standard. 
128 As a default, one might be prepared to assume that diversion ratios are proportional to market shares (as they are 
in the logit model of demand).  1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §2.211. However, additional information is 
commonly available, supporting an adjustment to this default assumption. 
129 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  41 
than indirect evidence in the form of market shares.  To the extent we employ markers other than 
market concentration for identifying adverse competitive effects, therefore, we think that doing 
so is consistent with the contemporary judicial understanding of the role played by market 
structure and other economic evidence in demonstrating market power and anticompetitive 
effects. 
  We also discuss the type of showing we think the merging parties should be required to 
make to satisfy their burden of production if they seek to rebut the government’s case by proving 
that entry or expansion will counteract or deter the competitive harm alleged by the government 
or by showing that efficiencies from merger will undermine the government’s prediction of 
adverse competitive effects.
130  We recognize that in the litigation context, the government will 
typically offer as part of its affirmative case evidence that entry would not solve the competitive 
problem, and that it has the option to do so as well with respect to efficiencies.
131  I f  t h e  
government has done so, defendants would typically need to offer more to satisfy their burden of 
production.  Our purpose in specifying what would count as a minimal showing for defendants 
with respect to entry, expansion, and efficiencies under the assumption that the government has 
offered no affirmative evidence on these issues is simply to discourage courts from relying on 
entry, expansion, and efficiency evidence that we believe to be insufficient even in the best of 
circumstances for the merging firms. 
 
  B. Coordinated Competitive Effects 
 
  The modern economic understanding of coordinated competitive effects focuses on 
whether coordination makes sense for each market participant.
132  In order for firms in a market 
to coordinate successfully, they must find a way to make the coordinated price more attractive 
                                                 
130 These possibilities do not exhaust the ways that the defendants could mount a rebuttal.  For example, the 
defendants could also offer evidence that undermines the probative value of the government’s showing of unilateral 
or coordinated effects.  We assume throughout that efficiencies would be analyzed as a defense – that is, that 
efficiencies are offered to defeat the government’s proof of higher prices or other competitive harm rather than as an 
affirmative defense that would excuse higher prices.   
131 In current practice, the government may instead addresses efficiencies in cross-examination and in rebuttal.  But 
a litigating party always has the option of exceeding its burden of production if it chooses to do so.   
132 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 44 (1964). 42 
than price-cutting for each.  To do so they must reach consensus over the coordinated 
equilibrium they will seek to achieve – selecting prices and allocating output or market shares 
among the sellers – and they must deter deviation from that consensus by making it unprofitable 
for each participant to expand output and reduce price below what would be required by the 
coordinated consensus.
133  Although some influential Chicago-oriented commentators have been 
persuaded that these cartel problems are virtually insurmountable,
134 modern economists 
generally accept that coordination can and does occur.
135 Moreover, coordination may well be 
imperfect and incomplete.
136 Under such circumstances, we would expect that some firms would 
be nearly indifferent between coordination and cheating, while others strongly prefer the 
coordinated outcome.  In antitrust parlance, a firm that is nearly indifferent between coordination 
and cheating, and in consequence constrains coordination from becoming more effective, is 
termed a “maverick.”
137
  Within this framework, horizontal mergers affect the likelihood and effectiveness of 
coordination by altering the constraints imposed by maverick producers.  If an acquisition 
involves a maverick, the merged firm would likely pose less of a constraint on coordination than 
before, leading to higher prices.
138  An acquisition involving a non-maverick may have a variety 
                                                 
133 On the economics of oligopolistic coordination, see generally Kaplow and Shapiro, supra n.43. 
134 E.g Bork, supra n.7 at 175. 
135 The active criminal antitrust docket shows that firms, even large and sophisticated ones, do find ways to fix 
prices; empirical research has identified coordinated conduct in some concentrated industries; and economic models 
of repeated oligopoly interaction show that higher-than-competitive coordinated pricing is often plausible even 
absent an express agreement on price. 
136 Coordinating firms may not achieve an outcome that maximizes their joint profits for a number of reasons, 
including the following four.  First, they may not be able to punish cheating as strongly as would be necessary.  In 
addition, they may not be able to allocate joint profits in a manner satisfactory to all because they may be unable to 
make side payments.  Third, they may need to reduce the coordinated price below the joint profit maximizing level 
or engage in occasional price wars in order to deter cheating in an environment of uncertainty.  Fourth, they may 
have difficulty identifying the joint profit maximizing outcome when coordinating over multiple products or markets 
without communicating. 
137  See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §2.12 (“In some circumstances, coordinated interaction can be 
effectively prevented or limited by maverick firms--firms that have a greater economic incentive to deviate from the 
terms of coordination than do most of their rivals (e.g., firms that are unusually disruptive and competitive 
influences in the market).”).  See generally, Baker, supra n.111. 
138 Baker, supra n.111 at 177-79.  It is also possible, though much less likely, that a merger involving a maverick 
would enhance the maverick’s incentives to keep prices low by generating large efficiencies in a setting where the 
merged firm has a strong incentive to pass cost savings through to buyers.  Id. at 179. 43 
of effects on competition.  For example, it could have no effect if it leaves the maverick’s 
incentives unchanged; it may benefit competition by creating a new industry maverick through 
efficiencies; or it may harm competition, if it leads to exclusion of the maverick.
139
  This perspective on coordinated effects suggests two different approaches to establishing 
a presumption of harm to competition through coordinated effects.
140  Both approaches begin by 
defining the relevant market, along the lines described in the Merger Guidelines, and by showing 
that the firms participating in that market could reasonably expect to solve the “cartel problems” 
of reaching consensus on terms of coordination and deterring deviation from those terms.   
Beginning with market definition dovetails nicely with theories of coordinated effects, since it 
involves identifying a group of firms, including the merging parties, that would find it profitable 
to engage in coordination.
141  
  The first approach then identifies the maverick firm constraining coordination,
142 and 
evaluates the effects of the merger on the coordination incentives of the various sellers in the 
relevant market.  Mavericks can be identified based on past conduct that constrained more 
effective coordination, based on the results of natural experiments that would be expected to lead 
a maverick to alter its price but would not affect the pricing of non-maverick firms, or by 
inference from features of market structure that tend to suggest that a firm would prefer a lower 
coordinated price than would its rivals.
143
                                                                                                                                                             
 
139  Id. at 186-88.  In addition, the merger of non-mavericks could lead the industry maverick to act less 
competitively than before, as by increasing the likely punishment were the maverick to cheat, or lead the industry 
maverick to act more competitively than before, for example if buyer responses to the merger reduce the maverick’s 
demand and make that demand more elastic.  Id. at 186-87.  These latter possibilities raise obvious difficulties of 
proof. 
140 See generally, Baker, supra n.111; Andrew R. Dick, Coordinated Interaction:  Pre-Merger Constraints and 
Post-Merger Effects, 12 Geo. Mason. L. Rev. 65 (2003). 
141 See generally, Baker, supra n.45. 
142 If the market pre-merger is not conducive to coordination, and firms are competing, there may be multiple 
mavericks that prevent coordination.  In the settings we are most concerned with, where it is more plausible that 
firms could reach consensus on the terms of coordination and deter deviation and firms are coordinating imperfectly 
pre-merger, it is possible to imagine multiple mavericks but that is unlikely unless the maverick firms are nearly 
identical. 
143 Baker, supra n.111 at 173-77. 44 
  The second approach proceeds by identifying changes in the structure of the relevant 
market that raise the odds that a merger would reduce the constraint that the maverick poses for 
coordination.  This approach is feasible even if a specific maverick firm cannot reliably be 
identified.  In implementing the second approach, the focus will usually be on the reduction in 
the number of significant sellers participating in the market and on changes in the extent to 
which the market participants differ, i.e., on asymmetries among sellers in the relevant market.  
The reduction in the number of sellers raises the odds that a merger involves a maverick – the 
type of merger most likely to enhance seller coordination – and those odds generally grow the 
most when the number of significant sellers is few.
144  If a merger narrows asymmetries among 
sellers – as by reducing the differences among sellers in product attributes or seller costs – it 
most likely reduces the odds that a maverick firm would prefer a substantially lower coordinated 
price than its rivals, and thus tends to lead to higher prices by making coordination more 
effective.
145
  These two approaches suggest what the government should be expected to prove in order 
to create a presumption that a horizontal merger makes coordination more likely or more 
effective.  Under either approach, the government must begin by defining the relevant antitrust 
market, and by showing that the market is conducive to coordination, i.e. that the firms could 
reasonably expect, after a merger, to reach consensus on the terms of coordination and deter 
deviation from those terms.   The latter is a familiar inquiry in antirust analysis.
146  Then the 
government must explain why it is plausible that the merger will make a difference, relying on 
either of the above two approaches.  
  Under the first route for establishing a presumption that the merger matters, the 
government would identify the likely maverick, and explain how the merger would change the 
maverick seller’s incentives so as to make coordination more likely or more effective.  Proof that 
                                                 
144 Id. at 198-99; see Dick, supra n.140 at 70-72. 
145 See Dick, supra n.140 at 72-76.   
146 For example, transparency of pricing combined with small, frequent transactions are thought to facilitate 
coordination by making it easier for firms to reach consensus and detect and police cheating.  See generally, e.g., 
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines§§2.11, 2.12; Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic & Jonathan B. Baker, 
Antitrust Law in Perspective:  Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy 223-28 (2002).  A history of 
collusion in the industry under study also provides evidence that coordination could occur, notwithstanding 
structural factors that might tend to suggest otherwise. 45 
the acquisition involves a likely maverick should be sufficient basis to presume harm to 
competition, for example.
147  
  Under the second route, the government would show that the odds are high that a 
maverick firm (not specifically identified) would prefer a higher coordinated price post-merger, 
thus making coordination more likely or successful.  To do so, the government would look to the 
number of significant firms
148 and to the effect of the merger on the differences among sellers.  
We could imagine several ways of making the necessary demonstration.  One involves simply a 
reduction in the number of significant firms.  For example, if the merger reduces the number of 
significant firms from, say, four to three, three to two, or two to one,
149 that change in market 
structure alone may alone be enough to create a presumption that the merger would make 
coordination more likely or more effective.
150  Alternatively, if it is difficult to be confident 
which individual sellers are significant, a presumption based solely on market concentration 
could be applied, illustratively if the post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) exceeds 
                                                 
147 That is, the acquisition of a maverick can be expected to alter the maverick’s incentives, and so make 
coordination more likely or more effective.  Cf. Horizontal Merger Guidelines §2.12 (“Consequently, acquisition of 
a maverick firm is one way in which a merger may make coordinated interaction more likely, more successful, or 
more complete.”). 
148 A significant firm with respect to a coordinated effects theory is one that could not be ignored by a cartel.  
(Coordinating firms might be able to ignore small firms unable to expand substantially, for example, because those 
sellers could not practically undermine coordinated pricing)   If a cartel could ignore, say, one of two firms but not 
both, only one would count as significant for purposes of determining the number of significant sellers.  In analyzing 
their own past enforcement policy, the Federal Trade Commission notes that significant competitors usually have at 
least a 10% market share. Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, 1996-2005 at 5 n. 16, 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/P035603horizmergerinvestigationdata1996-2005.pdf.  This figure could 
be adjusted in any particular case based on information about the ability and incentive of small firms to expand their 
sales in the relevant market.  
149 If the merger reduces the number of significant sellers from two to one, it may be more apt to describe the harm 
to competition as arising from the creation of a monopoly rather than by making post-merger coordination more 
likely or more effective. 
150 A four-to-three merger is a natural break point for creating a presumption of harm to competition from 
coordinated effects based solely on the number of firms.  If it is likely that a maverick firm constrains more effective 
coordination but the maverick’s identity is unknown, a merger combining at random two of the n significant firms 
participating in the market has a 2/n chance of involving a maverick.  (Mergers involving a maverick in a market 
conducive to coordination are highly likely to harm competition.)  Moreover, if the acquisition of a maverick can 
enhance the ability of firms to coordinate, the odds that a proposed merger would involve a maverick firm are likely 
greater than if merger partners were chosen at random.  Accordingly, it is more likely than not that a merger 
reducing the number of significant firms to three or less in a market conducive to coordination would harm 
competition by reducing the constraint posed by the maverick. 46 
2800.
151  In addition, if there are more than four significant sellers pre-merger, or if the post-
merger HHI is less than 2800, a court could still presume that the merger makes coordination 
more likely or more effective if the government also shows that the merger has made sellers 
more similar, as by reducing asymmetries in costs or product attributes.  Then a (weaker) 
presumption of harm to competition might reasonably be invoked for a merger that reduces the 
number of significant sellers to five, six or seven, for example, or raises the post-merger HHI to 
roughly equivalent levels.
152   
  Consistent with the legal framework, these presumptions would be rebuttable.  Some 
forms of rebuttal might go to whether the presumption was properly invoked.
153 Other forms of 
rebuttal might go to showing that the merger will not in fact alter the prospects for industry 
coordination, for example because the firms have no incentive to raise prices above the level 
likely to obtain absent the merger,
154 or because the maverick would have no less incentive to 
                                                 
151 The logic underlying this illustrative HHI break point for a presumption is related to the idea that a presumption 
based solely on the number of firms might be invoked for a merger reducing the number of significant firms to three 
or fewer.  An HHI of 3333 has a “numbers equivalent” of three firms, because a market with three identically-sized 
firms (market shares of 33.3%) would produce an HHI of 3333.  This is a conservative estimate of the HHI in a 
three-firm market, though.  If the market shares of the three sellers are not identical, as is almost invariably the case, 
the HHI would be higher.  In offering 2800 as a possible break point, we assume that the market is served by three 
significant firms that are identical and one just not-significant (proxied as a market share just under 10%), 
generating market shares of 30%, 30%, 30%, and nearly 10%, for an HHI of nearly 2800.  (Had we instead assumed 
two firms just insignificant based on market share, the HHI would have been about 2333.)   The difference between 
the HHI calculated this way and the numbers equivalent shrinks as the number of firms grows toward ten, so we 
simply use the numbers equivalent in reporting approximate HHI levels when we discuss market structures with 
more than three significant firms.   A presumption triggered by a post-merger HHI of 2800 is less restrictive than the 
presumption applied by the Supreme Court during the 1960s.  In all but one of the government’s Supreme Court 
merger victories between 1963 and 1970,  including Philadelphia National Bank, Pabst, and Von’s Grocery, the 
post-merger HHI was less than 2800.  Donald I Baker & William Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Pre-
Existing Law,  71 Calif. L. Rev. 311, 334 (1983).   
152 An HHI of 1667 has a numbers equivalent of six firms, for example.  The more convincing the demonstration 
that the firms could reasonably expect, after a merger, to reach consensus on the terms of coordination and deter 
deviation from those terms, the more comfortable a court could be in presuming coordinated effects based on post-
merger market structure when the HHI is below 2800.  Accordingly, we could imagine a court invoking a 
presumption of coordinated effects when a merger makes sellers more similar in a market with, say, ten firms post-
merger (HHI greater than 1000) if the market has a strong history of collusion and there was no good reason to think 
that the features of the market that had permitted successful collusion in the past had markedly changed. 
153 For example, the merging firms might seek to show that the government did not properly define the market, that 
shares were not calculated in appropriate units, that some firms were improperly deemed insignificant, or that the 
market has features not noted by the government suggesting that it is not conducive to coordination, and argue that 
these differences should affect whether the presumption was appropriately invoked. 
154 For example, the merging firms might show that industry participants have little incentive to raise price above the 
price that would likely obtain without merger given the effect of higher prices on their costs (loss of scale 47 
constrain coordination after the merger than before.
155  Or the merging firms might seek to rebut 
the presumption of harm to competition on the ground that entry or expansion would likely 
undermine or counteract any competitive effect of coordination, or that efficiencies from merger 
would make the deal pro-competitive on balance.   
  When entry is offered as a rebuttal argument, our primary concern in this paper is to 
discourage courts from presuming that entry is easy based on one example, as some courts have 
improperly done in the past.  This error can be avoided through careful application of the 
standards of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which require that committed entry be timely, 
likely and sufficient.
156  When efficiencies are offered as a rebuttal argument to a presumption 
about coordinated effects, it is important to note that efficiencies would not affect the 
coordinated price – would not be passed through to buyers – unless they lead the maverick to 
prefer a lower price or the merger creates a new maverick with the ability and incentive to 
compete more aggressively than before.
157  That is, the analysis of efficiencies must go beyond 
ensuring that they are merger-specific and can be verified – the primary criteria of the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines for efficiencies to be cognizable – and explain how the efficiencies would 
lead to lower prices given the way the market participants are thought to behave. 
  We do not claim to have provided an exhaustive list of methods the merging firms might 
employ to rebut the presumption of coordinated effects.  Nor have we attempted to sketch the 
kinds of evidence the government, on which the burden of persuasion rests, might offer in 
response to those rebuttal efforts. It should nevertheless be clear that there are many routes that 
defendants could employ to rebut the presumption.  The fact that there are many types of rebuttal 
arguments, however, does not mean that the presumption of coordinated effects afforded to the 
                                                                                                                                                             
economies), the effect of higher prices on the profits they receive from the sale of future products (if the firms are 
investing in market share), or the effect of higher prices in the market on profits to the same firms from selling 
complementary products (including sales of other products in “two-sided” markets). 
155 For example, the merging firms might seek to show that the maverick is not the firm the government claims and 
that the true maverick would not constrain coordination less than before; to show that the maverick would have no 
less incentive or a greater incentive to constrain coordination than before; or, when the government bases its 
presumption on market concentration rather than on identifying a maverick, to demonstrate that there is a maverick 
and it would not constrain coordination less post-merger than before. 
156 For a recent discussion of entry analysis under the merger guidelines, see Jonathan B. Baker, Responding to 
Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the Merger Guidelines, 71 Antitrust L.J. 189 (2003). 
157 Under an aggregate welfare standard, however, efficiencies would count in favor of the transaction even if they 
did not directly benefit buyers.  48 
government is weak.  A court should not lightly discard the inference that competition will be 
harmed that follows from a demonstration by the government of the factual predicates for 
invoking the presumption of coordinated effects set forth above.  In particular, to prevail, rebuttal 
arguments based on entry, expansion, and efficiencies must be based on strong evidence that is 
consistent with economic theory and pre-merger industry conditions.   
 
  C. Unilateral Competitive Effects 
 
  Since the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines were introduced, theories of unilateral 
effects have been pursued frequently by both agencies.  Even though our survey respondents 
reported a marked decline in interest at the agencies in unilateral effects cases over the past 
decade, they still reporting seeing unilateral effects cases somewhat more frequently today than 
coordinated effects cases (with the mix varying greatly by industry). 
  The economic theory of unilateral effects theories follows directly from non-cooperative 
theories of oligopoly, including the Cournot and Bertrand theories of oligopoly, which go back to 
the 19th century.  Over the past twenty-five years, substantial progress has been made in refining 
these theories and applying them to merger analysis, and in developing tools for this purpose, 
including sophisticated econometric methods of estimating demand and methods for simulating 
the effects of mergers using calibrated structural models.  The economic theory of unilateral 
effects is now very well understood, and we will not repeat that theory here.
158  
 In  practice,  unilateral effects cases typically arise in markets where the suppliers sell 
differentiated products, very often without binding capacity constraints, at least in the medium to 
long term.  Our treatment here focuses on that central case.
159
                                                 
158 For an extensive treatment, see Werden & Froeb, supra n.54.  See also Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, 
Paul Seabright, and Jean Tirole, The Economics of Unilateral Effects, Interim Report for DG Competition, European 
Commission, IDEI, Toulouse, 2003.  Kaplow & Shapiro, supra n.43, review and discuss this literature. 
159 Unilateral effects also arise in other settings, including the following three.  First, in bidding markets and 
auctions, the merging firms compete by bidding for the business of one or more customers, or participate in an 
auction to supply services to one or more customers.  This includes the case of price discrimination markets, where 
the suppliers compete to serve one customer or a group of similarly situated customers.  Competition in Oracle was 
of this nature.  The analysis of unilateral effects in bidding and auction markets is similar in spirit to the main case of 
differentiated product pricing competition.  Second, in markets with relatively homogeneous goods, firms may 
compete by choosing quantities, either production levels or capacities.  Market shares are highly relevant in these 
settings, where the Cournot model of oligopoly is applicable.  See Farrell & Shapiro, supra n.117.  Third, in a 49 
  In cases involving unilateral effects among sellers of differentiated products, the link 
between the market definition exercise and the theory of competitive effects tends to be much 
less direct than in cases involving coordinated effects.   In coordinated effects cases, the market 
definition exercise identifies a set of firms that collectively have an incentive to coordinate their 
prices, this being the mechanism of harm to competition.  In unilateral effects cases, the 
mechanism of harm does not directly involve any non-merging firms.  Instead, the theory is 
based on post-merger changes in the incentives of the merging parties.  Predicted unilateral 
effects depend primarily upon the cross-elasticity of demand between products sold by the 
merging firms, and on the price-cost margins associated with their products, but not directly on 
the market shares of the merging firms.   Furthermore, defining the relevant market may require 
that a bright line be drawn between products that are “in” or “out” of the market, when there is in 
fact no clear gap in the chain of substitutes. 
  Our proposal for establishing presumptions in unilateral effects cases takes account of 
these inherent economic features of markets with differentiated products.  The government can 
establish its prima facie case in either of two ways.  Both routes require the government to show 
that the merger will give the merged firm an incentive to raise the price of one or more of its 
products significantly, taking as given the prices charged by non-merging firms.  The incentive 
of the merged firm (A+B) to raise the price of a Product A sold by Firm A will typically depend 
most strongly on two variables: (1) the diversion ratio between Product A and Product B sold by 
Firm B, which is defined as the fraction of the lost sales for Product A that will be captured by 
Product B, and (2) the gross margin for Product B.
160  Both routes focus on demand-side factors 
only; we specify the elements that create a presumption based on the empirical generalization 
that within product-differentiated industries, an enquiry which looks only at demand substitution 
                                                                                                                                                             
market with a dominant firm and competitive fringe, a merger may reduce fringe competition (or, in the limit, create 
a monopolist).  
160 For a very simple version of the unilateral effects arithmetic, see Shapiro, supra n. 43.  See also Jonathan B. 
Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 11 Antitrust 21, 23 (1997).  For much more 
elaborate and sophisticated calculations, see Werden & Froeb, supra n. 54.  In a bidding or auction setting, the 
comparable logic depends upon the likelihood that the merging firms will be the first and second choices for the 
buyer or buyers involved. 50 
to identify market power, ignoring supply-side factors like cost differences and production 
capacities, is in general likely to be largely right.
161
  The first, and more traditional route, is for the government to define the relevant market, 
following the methods in the merger guidelines, show that the merger will substantially increase 
concentration in that market, and articulate the mechanism by which the merger will cause a 
price increase.
162  This mechanism will typically follow from the basic logic of unilateral 
competitive effects, with reference to the size of the pre-merger price-cost margins on the 
overlap products sold by the merging firms.
163  This route is consistent with a “default” 
assumption that the diversion ratios between the products sold by the merging firms are 
proportional to their market shares, as in the logit model of demand.  
  The second route is more direct and does not rely on defining the relevant market and 
measuring market shares.  Following this route, the government must establish that the diversion 
ratio between the merging firms’ products and the gross margins on those products are large 
enough to give the merged firm an incentive to raise the price of one or more of those products 
significantly (e.g., 5%, or some other appropriate figure).
164   Many types of evidence as to buyer 
                                                 
161 Baker & Bresnahan, supra n.16 (working paper at 26-27).   Baker and Bresnahan explain that a “key challenge 
for both antitrust analysis and empirical industrial organization economics going forward, not recognized in antitrust 
to the extent it is understood in economics, is to exploit similarities among related industries to focus an inquiry 
involving the industry and firms under study” and they identify and defend the empirical generalization we employ 
here.   
162 We would not insist that the merged firm have a dominant or near-dominant market share (contrary to what the 
court required in Oracle),   Because we would not require proof of any particular price increase when following this 
route (simply the showing of a mechanism by which prices would rise), we would permit the merging firms to take 
advantage of the general Guidelines safe harbor for an HHI less than 1000.  We also note that the specific unilateral-
effects safe harbor in §2.211 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, requiring that a merged firm have a market share 
of at least 35%, applies only when the unilateral effects mechanism is demonstrated through market shares.  We 
question whether the 35% figure is justified in light of the increased understanding of unilateral effects over the past 
fifteen years, though, and suggest that the enforcement agencies consider varying it on a sliding scale depending on 
price-cost margins or dispensing with it altogether. 
163 The magnitude of likely unilateral effects is stronger, the larger are these margins.  If the margins are very small 
for all of the overlap products, the government may fail to meet its initial burden. 
164 We are not proposing any particular quantitative benchmark for calibrating a price increase based on diversion 
ratios and price-cost margins.  For illustrative purposes a “significant” price increase here might be defined as 5%.  
This figure might be thought to be low, given that the government would prove this predicate for invoking a 
presumption without consideration of repositioning, entry or efficiencies, all of which would generally tend to 
reduce the actual magnitude of the price rise from merger.  On the other hand, this figure might be thought to be 
high, given that in principle a merger could violate the Clayton Act if it would lead to any harm to competition, 
including a price increase smaller than 5% in an appropriate case, and that in a large industry, substantial consumer 
harm could flow from a merger leading to, say, a 3% price increase.   We specify 5% here to illustrate our approach.   51 
substitution between the products sold by the merging firms, and thus as to the relevant diversion 
ratios, may potentially be used by the government at this stage.
165  Diversion ratios (or demand 
cross-elasticities) would summarize this information in a quantitative way, even if the most 
probative evidence about the magnitude of buyer substitution were qualitative rather than 
quantitative.  We envision the government offering a straightforward calculation based on 
diversion ratios and price-cost margins, along with some sensitivity analysis, although the 
government also could obtain the benefit of the presumption by presenting a more detailed 
simulation model. 
  If the government establishes its prima facie case, the burden shifts to the merging 
parties.  The first group of rebuttal arguments directly undermine the propositions put forward by 
the government.  If the government has taken the first route, the merging parties could show that 
the market has not been defined properly, that the government measured market shares 
incorrectly, or that the market shares mislead as to the likelihood of unilateral effects (as by 
presenting evidence of diversion ratios and price-cost margins).  If the government has taken the 
second route, the merging firms could show that the merged entity will not in fact have an 
incentive to raise the prices of any of its products significantly.  They could make this showing 
by proving that the diversion ratio between the merging firms’ products is lower than claimed by 
the government, or that the margin on the product to which sales are diverted is lower than 
claimed by the government. 
  If the government’s case withstands any such attacks, then the merging parties can also 
rebut by showing that other firms with similar products can and will reposition their products in 
response to the post-merger price increase asserted by the government and that such 
repositioning will deter or counteract any anti-competitive effects of the merger. Lastly, the 
merging firms can turn to the conventional three E rebuttal points: entry, expansion, and 
efficiencies.  These arguments would be treated in the same manner as we described above in our 
discussion of coordinated effects.
166
                                                 
165 Categories of evidence include buyer surveys, demand elasticity studies, information about buyer switching 
costs, and inference from company documents and monitoring of competitors   See Baker, supra n.45 at 139-
41(discussing sources of evidence of buyer substitution in the context of market definition). 
166 We emphasize that in the unilateral-effects context (as in the coordinated-effects context discussed previously), 
claims that there is an elastic supply of entrants at a price at or just above the pre-merger price are more easily made 52 
VI. Conclusion 
 
  Prospective horizontal merger enforcement is essential for protecting competition in a 
dynamic economy.  It is simply impractical to protect competition by adopting a policy of 
waiting for mergers to display adverse effects on competition and then seeking to undo the 
acquisitions that prove to be anti-competitive.  Unfortunately, prospective horizontal merger 
enforcement has fallen into decline, as a result of an unhappy combination of a more flexible 
economic approach, which we endorse, with the too-ready acceptance by some courts and 
enforcers of unproven non-interventionist economic arguments about concentration, entry and 
efficiencies.   
  To reinvigorate horizontal merger enforcement, we propose that enforcement agencies 
and courts rely more seriously on presumptions that allow the government to establish a prima 
facie case, which the merging parties can only rebut with strong evidence.  Relying more on 
presumptions would confer the advantages of clearer rules, thus reducing the transactions costs 
of enforcement and providing guidance to firms and courts.  By basing the presumptions on the 
modern economic understanding of the competitive effects of mergers, moreover, merger review 
can become more accurate.  We have proposed an analytical framework using presumptions that 
avoids systematically deterring beneficial mergers or permitting harmful ones. 
  We certainly do not propose a return to the horizontal merger control policies and 
precedents of the 1960s.  The presumptions we have described here would not be irrebuttable, 
though they would be influential.  They would be based on aspects of market structure, but not 
solely on market concentration, and in some cases, not on market concentration at all.  We have 
                                                                                                                                                             
than proven. Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole Story, 17 Antitrust 49 (2003), explain 
how one can test for consistency between pre-merger evidence and claims of post-merger price responses in the 
context of defining relevant markets.  This analysis is directly relevant for consistency checks in unilateral effects 
cases.  In general, claims of conveniently placed kinks in the supply curve of non-merging firms should be greeted 
with considerable skepticism. 53 
sketched here in general terms the types of presumptions we envision, recognizing that further 
refinement is required to put our ideas into operation.  We hope that our proposals will stimulate 
discussion about how best to reinvigorate merger enforcement, while leaving the details of an 
improved merger control framework to that discussion and future work.  
Appendix: Merger Enforcement Survey 
March 2007 
1.  Comparing Antitrust Division now (Barnett) vs. 5 (James) or 10 (Klein) years ago. 
1.a.  Compared with five years ago, do you believe that the Antitrust Division, in 
reviewing horizontal mergers, is more receptive to arguments made by the merging 
firms, less receptive or about the same? 
1.b.  Would your answer change if the comparison were between DOJ merger 
enforcement today and merger enforcement ten years ago?  If so, how? 
2.  Comparing FTC now (Majoras) vs. 5 (Muris) or 10 (Pitofsky) years ago. 
2.a.  Compared with five years ago, do you believe that the FTC, in reviewing horizontal 
mergers, is more receptive to arguments made by the merging firms, less receptive 
or about the same? 
2.b.  Would your answer change if the comparison were between FTC merger 
enforcement today and merger enforcement ten years ago?  If so, how? 
3.  Identifying where in the process enforcement has changed. 
Note: Only for those who answered “more receptive” or “less receptive” to 1 or 2 or both. 
  At what stage or stages of the merger review process do you notice that change? 
a.  In the likelihood that the agency [or agencies] will terminate an investigation 
rather than issue a second request in a given case. 
b.  In the likelihood that it [they] will close an investigation after a second 
request has been issued rather than seek remedies? 
c.  In the breadth and strength of the fix that the agency [or agencies] requires 
to avoid or settle litigation? 
4.   Comparing DOJ with FTC. 
4.a.  Do you see a significant substantive difference today between merger enforcement at 
the DOJ and at the FTC?   If so, what is the nature of the difference? 
4.b.  When you are hired to work on a deal and it is not clear whether the deal will be 
reviewed by the DOJ or the FTC, do you more often believe your client’s interests 
will be served by DOJ review, FTC review, or is there no difference? If so, why? 
5.  Receptivity of the agencies to various arguments.  Note:  respondent may need to 
distinguish between DOJ and FTC 
  
  I am now going to describe three arguments that merging firms sometimes make.  
With respect to each, please tell me whether you believe that the agencies are more 
receptive, equally receptive, or less receptive to the argument today as compared 
with ten years ago: 
5.a.  “Market concentration is not a good basis for predicting competitive effects.” 
5.b.  “Entry will counteract or deter any competitive problem.” 
5.c.  “The pro-competitive benefits of efficiencies from merger outweigh the threat of 
harm to competition.” 
6.  Competitive Effects Theories   
Note:  respondents may wish to distinguish between DOJ and FTC 
6.a  In your horizontal merger practice today, do you find that the agencies more often 
raise concerns based on a unilateral effects theory of competitive effects, a 
coordinated effects theory, or are the two theories raised with equal frequency?  
7. Unilateral  Effects 
7.a.    Are the agencies more interested, equally interested, or less interested in unilateral 
competitive effects theories today than five years ago? 
7.b.  Would your answer change if you went back ten years? 
8. Coordinated  Effects 
8.a.    Are the agencies more interested, equally interested, or less interested in 
coordinated competitive effects theories today than five years ago? 
8.b.  Would your answer change if you went back ten years? 
9.  Assessment of prospects 
9.a.  For a given horizontal merger, would your assessment of the likelihood of successful 
agency review for the merging firms be different now than it would have been five 
years ago?  If so, how? 
9.b.  Would your answer change if you went back ten years? 
10.  For better or for worse? 
10.a.  Have the changes in agency enforcement policy that you have described generally 
improved competition policy or have they been detrimental to effective competition 
policy? 
11.  Looking back longer. 
  
11.a.  What have been the major changes in the agency review of horizontal mergers over 
the past twenty years? 
12.  Prior Agency Affiliations 
12a.  Have you ever worked at the FTC or Antitrust Division?  If so, what was your 
highest position and in what years did you serve in that capacity? 
13.  Open Ended Final Question 
13a.  Is there anything else you would like to say about horizontal merger enforcement at 
the federal antitrust agencies? 
 
 